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UNIVERSALITY VERSUS NATIONALITY OF
AIRCRAFT*
MARGARET LAMBIEt

III.

THEORIES FOR DETERMINING NATIONALITY OF AIRCRAFT.

Definition of the nationality of aircraft is a matter of public
law, but the effects of such definition of nationality, although at
times matters of public law, are more often matters of private law,
according to Schreiber."" s He believed that "freedom of nationality"
of aircraft is repugnant to the political interests of all nations, as
also any principle of nationality which would virtually leave private
interests free to choose the nationality of the aircraft. The advantages sought from adopting the principle of nationality for
aircraft are primarily to prevent "freedom of nationality,"
Schreiber stated.
Of course it will never be possible to entirely prevent people from
choosing the nationality they desire for their aircraft; they will always have
imagination enough to find a way through the meshes of the law. But it is
nevertheless necessary to accept provisions defining the principles of the
nationality of aircraft as based upon the nationality of some individual or

legal entity.
Criteria advocated for determining the nationality of aircraft
include (1) nationality of the owner; (2) domicile of the owner;
(3) place of construction; (4) nationality of the pilot; (5) nationality of the holder or operator; (6) state where the aircraft
is kept; (7) state of registry, according to one of the above rules:
9
(8) state of registry, having freedom to determine its own rules.1
(1)

Theory According to Nationality of the Owner:.

Nationality of the owner is the rule adopted in most countries for determining the nationality of aircraft, or, in other words,
*Continued from the January Issue, 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 1-50.
tMember of the Bars of New York State and the District of Columbia and
of the Supreme Court of the United States; Certificate from the Academy of
International Law of the Hague; Member, American Society of International
Law, and International Law Association; Representative of the AIR LAW INSTITUTE at the International Congress of Comparative Law at the Hague, and
Associate Editor, THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW.
138. Schreiber, Otto, Principles of Draft Convention on Nationality of
"Aircraft, prepared for the Air Transport Committee, International Chamber
of Commerce (1929).
139. Consult, Fagg, F. D., Jr., "International Air Navigation Conventions
and the Commercial Air Navigation Treaties," 2 So. Cal. Law Rev. 430 (1929) ;
and Kingsley, Robert. "Nationality of Aircaft," 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 50
(1932).

[2461

UNIVERSALITY VERSUS NATIONALITY

an aircraft may be entered on the aeronautical register of a state
if the owner is a national of that state.
Under this theory the status of aircraft would be fixed and
satisfactory in the majority of cases. Diplomatic protection of
aircraft would not be separated from that of its owner, diplomatic
protection of the owner being determined by his nationality.
Among the advocates of this theory are Paul Fauchille, A. de La
Pradelle, and Amedeo Giannini.14 0 Giannini defends the rule for
determining nationality of aircraft according to nationality of
the owner, even if the fiction of a ship as part of national territory could be eliminated with respect to vessels. In his opinion the difference may be quantitative but not qualitative and he
uses a hydroplane floating upon the high seas to illustrate the
fact that in such a situation aircraft may be in all respects like a
.ship. A ship is movable property, an object, a means of communication, he says, and the relations between a state and its ships
are not simply control of a means of transportation but involve
political and economic matters. These motives in maritime law
as applied to aircraft are justified, according to Giannini, in order
to favor national construction of aircraft for economic reasons
and for preparedness in time of need for defense, and in order to
be assured that aircraft are owned by nationals in case of war.
The latter he considers more important than ownership of vessels
by nationals because of the ease with which a civil air fleet could
be turned into military uses. Even more important than for crews
of ships, he considers, is nationality requirement for the civil personnel on board aircraft, because of the smaller number of persons on aircraft and the great need for trained air pilots during
war. He concludes his arguments for determining nationality of
aircraft according to the owner of the aircraft by pointing out that
the social element of air navigation and subventions needed in development of rapid communication require the definite designation
of the relation between aircraft and the state, giving to aircraft a
legal individuality like that of ships, namely, a nationality, creating
rights and obligations on the part of the owner and of the state.
Under this system a foreign-owned aircraft as such is noticeable because of its foreign license. For purposes of sequestration
or requisition this may be advantageous, but it does not enable
the authorities to distinguish quickly between aircraft owned by
foreigners domiciled within' the state and those merely passing
140. Giannini Amedeo, "La Nazionalita degli Aeromobile." Rev. A6ronautique Internationale, 348, No. 5 (1932).
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through the state. Aliens domiciled, perhaps for many years, within a state and having few, if any, connections with their state of
origin often encounter much inconvenience and expense in having
their aircraft licensed and inspected in the latter state annually
and after each accident or repair. They may be discouraged or
even prevented by this system from owning aircraft.
Among the disadvantages argued against the rule of fixing
nationality of aircraft by nationality of the owner is that exclusive
sovereignty of a state within its own territory does not exist if the
state is a member of an international convention allowing foreignowned aircraft to be operated within the state. A solution has
been proposed, if standards were made reasonably uniform in the
different.countries, to have inspection by competent persons or by
an inspection company in the state where the aircraft is kept, with
registration at the consulate of the state of which the owner is a
national, provided the consulate does not have on its staff an
aviation expert to make inspections.
Manufacturers selling aircraft abroad have not been able,
it appears, to retain property rights in the aircraft sold by them
until payment was finally completed, because the buyer had to have
the aircraft registered in his own country as belonging to a national or a company *of that country. Another objection is that
aircraft belonging to an owner of a given nationality cannot be
operated entirely abroad because the government of the country
in which the aircraft are registered is without jurisdiction abroad
as to navigability, licenses, and pilot regulation.
Objections to this theory are advanced by Pittard as follows :'Comment se dtermine actuellement la nationalit6 d'un a~ronef? En
dehors des l6gislation nationales, il est tin texte officiel qui donne A cet
6gard toutes les pr&isions possibles: c'est la Convention portant r~glementation dQ la navigation adrienne en date du 13 Octobre 1919, dite Convention
de Paris. L'Article 7 est ainsi con~u: "Les a&onefs ne seront immatriculis dans un des Etats contractants que s'ils appartiennent en entier ai
des ressortissants de cet Etat . . ." II en r6sulte que l'a6ronef est inscrit
dans rEtat dont le propri~taire est ressortissant. Cette r~gle d~montre
l'exactitude de ce que nous disons plus haut A savoir que l'a&onef n'a ou
ne prend une nationalit6 que par son propridtaire; mais elle petit crder une
situation juridique anormale.
Ainsi, il existe A l'Aroport de Gen~ve un gros avion de tourisme qui
appartient A un citoyen anglais. Comme la loi exige l'immatriculation dans
le pays d'origine du propri~taire, cet avion est immatricul6 en GrandBretagne o6i il n'est peut-Etre jamais all6; en revanche, il est gar6 constam141. Pittard, E., Report to Air Transport Co-operation Committee of the
League of Nations. 2nd Session, 1931.
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ment en Suisse oii il circule librement en vertu de la Convention anglosuisse de 1919; la Grande-Bretagne ne peut exercer A son 6gard ni contr6le
technique, ni surveillance puisqu'il se trouve constamment A l'6tranger, par
contre la Suisse, qui pourrait assumer cette charge, n'a qu'un droit de police.
Si cet appareil cause un dommage, quel sera le for judiciaire? Le lieu
d'immatriculation? Ce seraient donc les tribunaux anglais qui seraient comp~tents et l'on voit toute la port~e de cette r6gle et les inconvenients particuliers qu'elle cr6e; on a cherch6 A obvier A cet inconvenient par une
drogation legale de for, c'est-A-dire en admettant la competence du tribunal
du lieu de l'accident; si l'accident se produit en Suisse, le tribunal Suisse se
trouveri competent non pas parce qu'il est le lieu ot l'appareil a son port
('attache, mais en raison de cette d6rogation de for.
Si l'on consid6re cette question du point de vue de la cooperation entre
les aviations civiles, on peut constater qu'il y a un avantage ind~niable A
confrer des droits et A imposer des obligations aux exploitants dans les
lieux o6 ils travaillent, tandis qu'il est contraire A une saine pratique de
renvoyer A des juridictions 6trang6res la connaissance de litiges n6s dans un
lieu dont les tribunaux, par suite d'une simple fiction de nationalit6, ne
seraient pas comp6tents.
Cet article 7 nous parait donc d6fectueux; mais il y a plus, et l'article 6
confront6 avec l'article 7 est encore plus curieux. L'article 6 est ainsi conqu:
"Les a6ronefs ont la nationalit6 de l'Etat sur le registre duquel ils sont
immatricul~s conformement aux pr6scriptions de la Section 1 de l'Annexe
A."
Cet article pose donc comme r~gle que l'immatriculation confute la
nationalit6; or, c'est un pl6onasme puisque seul un national a le droit d'immatriculer un aronef dans son pays; c'est une h6r~sie s'il s'agit de donner
par IA une nationalit6 propre A l'appareil en plus et quelquefois en dehors
de celle que poss~de son propri~taire ou son exploitant. Aujourd'hui les
juristes tendent de plus en plus A substituer A la nationalit6 la notion de
domicile; cette orientation nouvelle correspond A l'6volution des relations
internationales et au d~veloppement totljours plus grand du cosmopolitisme.

In objecting to the test of ownership, Schreiber said :142
The fact that some of the more recent legislation rejects the principle
of the nationality of the owner would seem to point to the possibility that
a mistake was made when it was taken as the basis of the Convention of
October 13, 1919, and of the national laws of most countries.

Reference has previously been made to the Protocol of 1929
amending the Convention of 1919 as to Article 7,143 so that the
rule of determining nationality of aircraft by the nationality of the
owner is no longer imposed upon adhering states. But states may
retain or adopt any rule for the registration of aircraft in accordance with their laws. In practice today most states have the rule
of nationality of the owner.
142.

Schreiber, Otto,

Principles of Draft Convention

Aircraft, cit. note 138 supra.
143.
See Part 1, 5 JOURNAL or AIR

on Nationality

LAW 1, 16, and Theory

(8)

infra.

of
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The fact that an American citizen, for example, can buy but
not register an aircraft in France, since it must be registered in
the United States where it would have to be sent for technical
verifications, and the fact that the legal owner of an aircraft in
France, if an alien, may not operate it there, influenced the International Chamber of Commerce to recommend to all governments to renounce in their legislation the principle of making
registration of aircraft depend upon the nationality of the owner.
In like manner the Air Transport Cooperation Committee of
14
the League of Nations adopted the following resolution : 4
The Committee notes that the last ratifications of the Protocol of 1929
will shortly confer on states parties to the 1919 Convention the freedom
which other states not parties to the Convention already possess to settle
each for itself the conditions under which aircraft are to be registered. It
considers it desirable that, in national laws, the registration of aircraft
should not depend solely on the owner's nationality; it should also be possible to register aircraft, the owners of which are foreigners settled in the
territory.

(2)

Theory According to Domicile of the Owner:

Domicile of the owner as a test for determining the nationality
of aircraft has been advocated from several points of view. The
Air Transport Cooperation Committee of the League of Nations
in its above-mentioned resolution denouncing the test of nationality
for aircraft according to nationality of the owner, concluded as
follows:
It [the Committee] also expressed a hope that, the rule based on the
effective domicile of the owner, subject to any rules laid down by national
law concerning duration, will be uniformly adopted for this registration.
It being admitted that each aircraft must be registered in one country and
in one country only, these uniform rules should allow the possibility of
registering aircraft belonging to the national companies having some foreign capital or directors.

An early discussion of foreign-owned aircraft reads as follows

:115

On 6viterait ces inconvEnients, en permettant aux 6trangers d'acqurir
pour leurs aronefs, la nationalit6 du pays dans lequel ils ont leur domicile.
Cependent, ceci pourrait avoir des inconv6nients non seulement pour des
raisons de securit6 nationale, mais aussi dans le cas oi un aronef ayant la
nationalit6 du pays oii son propri~taire est domicili6, passerait dans le pays
natal de ce dernier. II s'6lverait alors ]a question suivante: "L'Etat,
144. May 9-12, 1932.
145. Meyer, Alexander, "Le Drolt Arflen & Ia Session de I'Institut de Droit
International, les Deux Institutions" [Comit6 Juridique de i'Avlation], 2 Rev.

Juridique Inter. de Ia Locomotion Arlenne 300 (1911).
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ayant confer6 sa nationalit6 aux aironefs 6trangers, peut-il pritendre A la
protection de ces a6ronefs contre les lois du pays natal du propritaire?"
Dans la session de I'Institut, cette question fut discut6e et 1a majorit votant
la negative, on prit la r6solution suivante: "L'Etat qui immatricule l'aronef d'un propri~taire &ranger, ne saurait toutefois pr6tendre
la protection de cet aronef sur le territoire de l'Etat dont relive cc propri6taire,
contre l'application des lois par lesquelles cet Etat aurait interdit A ses
nationaux de faire immatriculer leurs aronefs A.l'tranger."
Wegerdt also advocates the theory of 'domicile of the owner :141
The difficulties which present themselves if the registration of aircraft
is made to depend on the nationality of the owner could be more easily
avoided by the decision that the proprietor of aircraft must have his domicile
in the country in which the aircraft should be registered.
The International Chamber of Commerce has declared its
preference for the method of choosing nationality of aircraft according to the domicile of the owner. In this connection for corporations, it favors siege social, the headquarters or principal place
of business.
Residence in a country, particularly for a long period, implies,
it is claimed, a connection with that country which, in the case of
aliens, often creates a sense of attachment, and with such attachment an understandable desire to own personal property in the
same manner as nationals of that state. Under the theory of
domicile of the owner, it would be possible for aliens to own aircraft and register aircraft in the country where the alien owners
live, on the same terms allowed nationals domiciled in the state.
A distinction is sometimes made between the "domicile" of a
person and his "residence," the former usually being the basic
place, his legal residence for certain matters, and the latter, a
home, or a more temporary place, for purposes of local taxation,
public health, and police regulations, etc. Confusion arises from
the interchange and undefined meaning of these words. "Residence" is the term used in naturalization procedure of the United
States. Permanent abode is the meaning preferred by those who
support the domicile theory for registering aircraft.
Jurists who advocate the test of domicile for determining nationality of aircraft are in accord as to the general principle, but
vary on the point of whether the domicile to be used as the test
shall be thai of the owner of the aircraft, that of the operator, or
of the aircraft itself. Some jurists maintain that the domicile of
146. Wegerdt, Alfred, "Germany and the Aerial Navigation Convention at
Parts, October 13, 1919," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 19 (1930), reprinted from
2 Zeitschrift fMr das Gesamte Luftrecht 25

(1928).
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the aircraft, together with registry of the aircraft in the locality
of such domicile, give nationality to the aircraft independent of
the nationality or domicile of the owner of the aircraft.
The domicile theory in general is discussed by Pittard :14T
II est conform6 au droit et A la logique de soumettre l'indiv'du et ses
biens aux lois du pays dans lequel ilsse trouvent. Le domicile est le centre
I6gal de l'activit humaine et il semble normal de soumettre les rapports

juridiques A la connaissancq des tribunaux du lieu o6ileur auteur a fix6 sa
demeure. Nous savons que la notion de domicile n'a pas partout la m~me
signification jurilique; aussi n'est-il pas dans notre intention de determiner
ledomicile du propri~taire ou de I'exploitant par une formule qui, vraisemblablement, heurterait la conception juridique de ce terme dans l'esprit de
plusieurs I6gislations.

Cc que l'on est en droit d'exiger dans le domaine a&ien comme dans la
marine, c'est qu'il n'y ait pas de vaisseaux fant6mes; un navire doit avoir
un port d'attache; un a&onef doit 6galement avoir un domicile. "
Repoussant donc la nationalit6 comme crit~re de l'immatriculation, nous
admettions le lieu o6 I'a~roncf aura son port d'attache; nous admettions
comme raisonnable et conform6 aux exigences modernes la lgislation de la
R~publique Argentine, qui accorde I'acc~s de son r6gistre d'immatriculation
a toutes personnes 6tablies stir son territoirc.

An objection to this system is that nationals of one state domiciled in another state would own aircraft licensed by the latter
state. When such owners return in their own aircraft to their
state of origin, they would arrive in a "foreign" plane, and might
find themselves in embarrassing situations. Would the registering
state give them diplomatic protection as against the government
of the state of which they are nationals?
(3)

Theory According to Place of Construction:

Place of construction as the test for giving nationality to aircraft was proposed as being the place of origin of the aircraft. 4
The contention was that an aircraft must have a certificate of
navigability before it takes the air, and that this certificate would
be naturally obtained at the place in which the machine has been
constructed. Applicable also to this theory is the argument used
in favor of nationality for ships, namely, protection of secrets of
manufacture and training of expert builders. The objections to
this theory are that an aircraft might have a body of one make
and engine of another, constructed in different countries; that this
test for nationality of aircraft might confer a special privilege
147. Pittard, B.,
note 141 aupra.

148.

114 (1912).

Report to Air Transport

Co-operation

Committee,

Cit.

Armengavd, M., 3 Rev. Juridlque Inter. do Ia Locomotion Adrienne

UNIVERSALITY

VERSUS NATIONALITY

tending toward the exclusion of aircraft manufactured in other
countries; and that it might also lead to many administrative difficulties. The theory has found little support.
(4)

Theory According to Nationality of the Pilot:

Nationality of the pilot as a criterion for determining the nationality of aircraft is a theory based primarily on a desire to
protect points of military importance against espionage by one who
may become in the future an enemy alien, and to a less degree by
the desire to keep all the chances of gain resulting from aviation
for the state's own citizens, as well as to ensure that the pilot will
be readily accessible for the purpose of redressing any wrongs
committed by him. This rule is not necessary to accomplish these
ends, Kingsley points out,14 9 because civil liability, by most national
laws, has been attached to the owner, either in lieu of or jointly
with the pilot or operator, and because some protection against
espionage is assured by the fact that prohibited zones are closed
to national as well as to foreign aircraft. Administrative problems would appear to be numerous under this test because of frequent shifts in the personnel of aircraft.
(5)

Theory According to Nationality of the Holder or Operator:

Nationality of the operator as a test for conferring nationality
upon aircraft was advocated by Schreiber on the ground that
ownership is not sufficient to determine nationality of the aircraft.
Operation is the closest economic tie between an aircraft and a
person, he believed, and he gave examples where the operator
or the person in control is held responsible.1 50 Usually the owner
is the operator, but frequently the operator is a lessee or a buyer
who has not yet acquired full property rights in the aircraft.
Because of his right of ownership the owner of an aircraft
may do anything with the aircraft he pleases, as long as he does
not disobey the law, interfere with the rights of others or with
the public safety. Operation of an aircraft is distinguished from
ownership. Often the owner never intends to operate his aircraft
himself, but to lease it.
The registration by the holder instead of the owner could not
be accepted in Germany, according to Wegerdt, since the concept
149. Kingsley, Robert, "Nationality of Aircraft," cit. note 139 supra, p. 53.
150. Schreiber, Otto, Principles of Draft Convention on Nationality of
Aircraft, cit. note 138 supra; cites the law of Argentina, where aircraft operated within the national territory may be registered in that state.
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of a holder is not sufficiently clear to justify inscription in a public register."" Whether the holder or operator should be enrolled
on the aeronautical register, whether the owner or operator of
aircraft shall be liable separately or jointly, and whether such lia152
bility shall be absolute or limited has caused much discussion.
Objections to this theory are that operators and holders may
change frequently, and that under this rule it would be difficult to
determine nationality of aircraft, especially in international service.
(6)

Theory According to Place Where the Aircraft Is Kept:

The place where the aircraft is kept, sometimes called the place
of registry, port d'attache, or domicile of the aircraft, has a number of supporters as a theory for determining the nationality of
aircraft. An analysis of the admiralty term, "port d'attache," is
given by Henry-Cofiannier. 153 He asks why the analogy of a
"port d'attache" for ships is applied to the place where the aircraft
is registered, explaining that the expression "port d'immatriculation" appeared in the maritime world before the term "port d'attache," which was used in the French law of 1852. In 1874 the
use of "port d'immatriculation" again appears. The English Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 contains the term "registered port,"
and a very early law of the United States speaks of "home port."'15
Henry-Cofiannier considers the latter expression the equivalent of
"domicile," the use of which word he prefers, and the interpretation of "domicile" he gives as the "place of registration." He
considers that nationality is not alone sufficient and that in addition to nationality an aircraft must have a "domicile."
A distinction is made by Spaight between "port d'attache,"
interpreted as the "port of registry," and the airdrome which is
the aircraft's "home." Spaight believes that an aircraft should
have a fixed headquarters and that the aircraft should be reg151. Wegerdt, Alfred, "Germany and the Aerial Navigation Convention
at Paris, October 13, 1919 " cit. note 146 aupra.
152. When a German owner, for example, leases a plane to an Austrian
air transport company which operates the aircraft in Italy, if the state flown
over imposes absolute liability on the owner, and if the owner has relied upon
the operator's taking out insurance, the owner may find himself liable for
damages which he never contemplated. His protection is to carry insurance
as well as having the operator do so, but that appears to be adding too great
a burden: Wegerdt, Al(red, "Das Eigentum am Luftfahrzeugen," Text in
German and French published in Rev. Aeronautique Inter. 215, No. 4 (1932).
See Draft Convention Relative to Liability for Damages Caused to Third Parties on the Surface, adopted by the International Technical Committee of
Aerial Legal Experts, Treaty Information, Department of State, Bulletin
No. 36, p. 14 (1932).
153. Henry-Coilannier, "Des Ports d'Attache et de la Nationalit6 des
AMronefs," 1 Rev. Juridique Inter. de la Locomotion Afrlenne 174, 332 (1910).
154. Act of December 31, 1792.
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istered in the state in which the headquarters of the aircraft are
situated. 151
In general, the domicile, port d'attache, or place of registry,
would be the same as the domicile of the owner, according to
Oppenheim. 156 But the test of domicile of the aircraft in preference to the owner's nationality is defended on the ground that some
people have double nationality, some have doubtful nationality.
and others have no nationality at all.
If the aircraft changes its "home," then Spaight says its
registration and its "quasi-nationality" would be changed, but he
believes there should be no greater frequency of changes under a
system based on domicile of the aircraft than under that based bn
nationality of the owner. He mentions, for example, cases where
aircraft are sold to foreigners.
In fixing the identity of the aircraft there are advantages in
looking solely to the aircraft's actual physical location. Customs
and police authorities are in close touch with all airports and therefore could keep track of the foreign-owned aircraft usually placed
there. On the other hand, when there is no distinction as to the
marks on foreign-owned aircraft, there is less likelihood that a
foreign plane might be discriminated against in matters of landing,
securing assistance and obtaining witnesses.
The state from which the aircraft operates is more concerned
than the state of the owner's nationality. The former has power
to exclude aircraft or refuse flying privileges. It might find it
easier to requisition aircraft under this theory. Divald 1 57 considered the test of port d'attache the best one because it gives the
state where the aircraft is habitually located power to refuse registration, if necessary to protect its security, and to stipulate special conditions in the exercise of its sovereignty. Another argument advanced for taking the domicile of the aircraft as the test
of nationality of aircraft is that acts and relations resulting from
air navigation must be under legal regulation from the point of
view of public law, and that certain questions under private law,
such as mortgages, would be determined by the law of the state
where the aircraft has its permanent abode. Added to the legal
reasons are economic ones, especially in small countries where the
development of air navigation is in the hands of foreigners and
where, in some cases, subsidies are given to foreign companies.
155. Spaight, J, M., Aircraft in Peace and the Law (London: Macmillan
& Co.. Ltd., 1919). See Theory (7). infra.
156. 1911 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International 307, 310.
157. Divald, Hugo, "La NationalitO et le Port d'Attache des A~ronefs,"
6 Rev. Juridique Inter. de la Locomotion A~rlenne 501 (1922).
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In answer to the objection that a state under this system would
assume protection of aircraft belonging to foreigners, Divald replies that the aircraft itself would have a nationality in international relations independent of the owner. He cites precedents for
this situation in commercial treaties providing mutual benefits for
products of the respective countries and certain rights given to
foreign traders and manufacturers who live and work permanently
in a state. As to the objection that during war foreign aircraft
could not be distinguished, Divald suggests that all aircraft in a
state would have the same nationality, that of the registering state,
and therefore all could be seized by the government of that state,
regardless of ownership by nationals or by foreigners.
Arguments for using domicile of the aircraft to determine
the nationality of the aircraft are in general the same ones which
are used against the test by nationality of the owner, especially
as to corporate owners. Kingsley adheres to the view of port
d'attache as the test for determining the place of registration of
aircraft. He suggests that by a subordinate agreement, the nations
parties to the international conventions on air navigation could
well provide for inspections of aircraft to be made by the country
of the aircraft's port d'attache; for the registering authority to
assign to each aircraft an identification mark, indicating, as do the
present marks, the nationality of the owner; for determining corporate ownership according to local law, and joint ownership according to the nationality of the owners of the majority interest,
158
or by election of a nationality when co-partners are equal.
In arguing against the test of nationality of aircraft according
to the domicile of the aircraft, Henry Fabry says:1S9
On pourrait parfaitement concevoir que I'a6ronef diit obligatoirement
Le port d'attache
avoir la natio-ialit6 du pays de son port d'attache. ...
entraine ipso facto la nationalit6, le principe est simple et d'application facile.
. . .En effet, des 6trangers peuvent possder un aronef dans tin pays
dont ils ne relvent pas. Si l'on attribue A l'appareil dont ils sont propritaires la nationaliti du port d'attache le contr6le et ]a surveillance de
cet aronef appartenant A tin 6tranger seront illusoires, car tin avion ayant
le pavillon du pays qu'il survole habituellement passe plus facilement inaperqu qu'un avion battant pavilion 6tranger. . . . Si donc l'on adoptait
le syst~me de lex soli, les agents diplomatiques et consulaires se verraient
dans bien des cas obliges d'entrevenir en faveur d'une personne 6trangre A
raison du fait qu'elle poss6derait un avion battant pavilion de leur pays.
C'est donc A bon droit qu'il a 6t6 repouss6.
158. Kingsley, Robert, "Nationality of Aircraft," cit. note 139 supra, p. 56.
159. Henry-Fabry, "De la Nationalit6 des Atronefs," 6 Rev. Juridique
Inter. de la Locomotion Atrienne 857 (1922).
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On the other hand, Visscher' 60 does not believe that in adopting the rule of determining nationality of aircraft by the domicile
or port d'attache of the aircraft, the aircraft itself would acquire
a nationality effective beyond the limits of the state boundaries,
or, in other words, that the aircraft would, as a "personality"
apart from the owner, attract in foreign countries diplomatic protection by the state of the port d'attache.
In discussing domicile of aircraft, Henry-Cojiannier writes:"'1
La nationalit6 d'un adronef nest pas suffisante pour permettre de latteindre surement. II faut encore que l'adronef soit attach6 a un lieu
determine, A tin "domicile." Nous avons employ6 cette expression en parlant
de l'acte de nationalisation. Nous la substitutions a celle de "port d'attache"
qui a &6 employde jusqu'ici par les diffdrents auteurs. Ils l'avaient choisie
par analogie A la navigation maritime. Outre qu'elle a un charactdre trop
national, 6tant une expression speciale an droit franqais, elle a le difaut de
laisser supposer que l'on n'envisage dans la navigation arienne que des
voyages d'un point d'attache A tin autre point d'attache determine. Nous
avons dejA dit, en parlant du droit A l'atterrissage, ce que nous pensons de

cette manidre de voir: ses partisans negligent les necessitis techniques de la
locomotion adrienne et manquent de confiance en son avenir.
La rdpartition sur le territoire des points oit un adronef devra itre
declar6 depend des r~glements int&rieurs.
La question des ports d'attache est different en ce sens qu'elle ne consiste pas A dtermincr A quelle nation 'a6ronef appartient, mais A quel lien
il est attach6.

A composite picture of the above interpretations of this theory
presents a fuzzy appearance. There is room for clarification of
concept and terminology concerning the "place where an aircraft
is kept" and its bearing upon the so-called nationality of aircraft.
(7)

Theory According to State of Registry:

The state of registry as a criterion for determining nationality
of aircraft, the power to register being determined by one of the
above rules, was the theory at first adopted in the Convention
of 1919, which combined it originally with above rule (1), namely,
nationality of the owner. A state may adopt above rule (2),
namely, domicile of the owner, or may combine above rules (1)
and (2), in which case the owner must be a national and' must
also have his domicile in the registering state. The other four
rules may also be the basis of registration to give, under this
theory, nationality to aircraft.
160.
Question
(Text in
161.

Visscher

Ferdinand de, "Le

Regime

Juridique

Atmospheric

et la

de la Nafionallt des A6ronefs," 2 Zeit. fir das Gesamte Luftrecht 18
French) (1928).
Henry-Coiiantier, A., "Des Ports d'Attache et de la Natonalt des
AMronefs," cit. note 163 supra, p. 332.
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The place of registration of the aircraft for determining the
nationality of aircraft is a theory which was well received before
1919 by the British subcommittee of the International Juridical
Committee on Aviation, by the Institute of International Law at
the Madrid Conference of 1911, and by the Commission which
was appointed by the International Federation of Aviation, which
drew up an International Convention at Brussels in May, 1912.
The Institute adopted a rule recognizing the right of a state, whose
law forbade its citizens to register their aircraft abroad, to refuse
to recognize within its own jurisdiction foreign registration of
aircraft owned by its citizens. According to Spaight, there is
much to be said for taking the place of registration as the criterion,
so long as it is also the place of the aircraft's headquarters or its
"home."
Registration of ships, dating from 1660 in England, was originally designed to restrict British commerce by sea to British ships,
but that purpose has- long been outgrown and now the register
is the appointed record of title to property in British ships. Registration does not confer nationality upon British ships but nationality, so-called, apparently results automatically from the ownership
of a ship by a British subject or corporation. Registration and
nationality of ships are interconnected in admiralty, but this occurs
for reasons which do not appear to apply in the case of aircraft.
If nationality is allowed to aircraft, according to Spaight, it should
be a quasi-nationality, perhaps a conditional nationality which will
come into being only in certain circumstances, as, for example,
when the aircraft is passing over the high seas.
Pittard suggests that the domicile of the owner and the port
d'attache of the aircraft should determine the nationality of aircraft. 1 2 He compares aircraft to automobiles. In that case, the
method used for registering automobiles of resident aliens could be
applicable to aircraft. 68
Only one place of registration would be allowed an owner of
aircraft, whether an individual or corporation, under this theory,
even though the owner had "residences," or business branches in
other states, the exchange between states of lists of registered aircraft making this limitation practicable, it is claimed.
Concerning national flags for aircraft and the import of such
162. See Pittard quotation under Theory (2).
163. See Spaight, J. M. Aircraft In Peace and tOn Law, cit. note 154
aupra, p. 15, referring to 3 Rev. Juridique Inter. de la Locomotion Arienne
113(1912); 2 Rev. 299 (1911); 3 Rev. 123 (1912); 5 Rev. 15 (1914).

UNIVERSALITY VERSUS NATIONALITY

flags, two French writers'14 say that a distinctive mark was deemed
necessary in case of liability, making known at the same time both
the nationality and the domicile of the aircraft:
Its proposent d'ajouter

..

.: "tout aronef devra porter une marque

distinctive itablissant sa nationalit6. . . . Dans le cas oit le domicile de
l'a~ronef ne serait pas situ6 dans l'tat dont ii a la nationalit6
it devra porter
'6 5
en outre la marque du pays oii it a son domicile. 1
The chief objection raised to the place of registration as a
test for determining nationality of aircraft is that a friendly airship
could not be distinguished from an enemy suspect. On the other
hand, if all states agree upon one rule, there would at least be
some advantage in uniformity.
(8)

Theory According to State of Registry:

Each state entirely free to determine its own rules is the
theory adopted in Article 8 of the Pan American Convention on
Commercial Aviation and in Article 7 of the Convention of 1919
as amended.'
This theory represents a compromise concerning
methods for determining nationality of aircraft, and at the present
time receives considerable support. It presents a working basis
for certain practical difficulties, but it does not solve all the difficulties. If states are free to determine their own rules, some states
are likely to enact or retain on their statute books legislation embodying some of the features objectionable from an international
viewpoint. Uniformity of rules, if desirable, will be less easily
attained under this theory, and it is even possible that, because
of lack of uniformity of the national rules, an owner of aircraft
may find himself unable to register his aircraft in any country.
He may, however, be so situated that he could register several
aircraft in as many countries, provided he maintains residences in
foreign states in addition to the legal domicile in his own state,
and provided the state laws permitted such registration. This
might also apply to corporations having business branches abroad.
A report written in 1911 throws some light on the reasoning
resorted to in working out theories of nationality of aircraft :117
Les deux institutions [Comit6 International Juridique de 'Aviation et
Institut de Droit International] s'accordent de mEme sur les points suivants:
"Chaque aronef doit avoir une nationalit6 et une seule dont les marques
doivent tre extrieurement reconnaissable. Tons les aronefs doivent tre
164.
165.
166.

167.

Marguerie and Carpentier.
2 Rev. Juridlque Inter. de la Locomotion Afrienne 76 (1911).
See Part I, 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 1. 43-46.
Meyer, Alexander, "Le Droit Arien," cit. note 145 sunpra, p. 298.
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immatriculks." (Cf. art. 2,6 des resolutions du Comit6, nos. 2 et 3, des
resolutions de lInstitut). Au contraire, les r~solutions prises au sujet des
circonstances d~terminant la nationalit6, sont diffrentes. Tandis que l'Institut veut faire d6pendre la nationalit6 de l'a~ronef de la nationalit6 du lieu
d'immatriculation (R6s. 2), le Comit6 la fait d6pendre de la nationaliti du
propri~taire. II y a ici la diff rence pratique, que, d'apr~s les r~solutions de
l'Institut, des aronefs appartenant A des 6trangers peuvent obtenir la
nationalit dii pays qui les imnatricule, car le lieu d'immatriculation est
decisif. Les rsolutions du Comit6 rendraient cela impossible, la nationalit6
du propri~taire d~terminant la nationalitE de l'aronef. D'apr~s les r~solutions de l'Institut, l'immatriculation d'un a~ronef serait la seule condition
de l'acquisition de sa nationalit6; tandis que, d'apr~s les resolutions du
Comit6, l'immatriculation ne serait que sa condition d'exploitation, mais ne
d~ciderait pas de la nationalit6 (Cf. art. 6 du projet). Dans cc cas, l'immatriculation ne ferait que confirmer Ia nationalit6 de l'aronef, pourvu
que les lois de I'Etat en qucstion permettent l'immatriculation. Car les
resolutions du Comit remettent aux Etats le droit de r~gler les conditions
d'immatriculation. D'apr~s les r6solutions du Comit6, il scrait donc possible
aussi que des aronefs 6trangcrs fussent immatricul6s dans le pays oAi ils
stationnent. Mais l'immatriculation ne leur procurerait jamais la nationalit6
du pays dans lequel elle a &6 prise; elle ne serait que le confirmation de la
nationalit6 trang~re par les autorit~s du pays. Si, d'autre part, l'Etat en
question, par example l'Allemagne, n'admet que l'immatriculation d'aronefs
du pays, les resolutions de l'Institut, concernant l'immatriculation des a6ronefs 6trangers (no. 2, phrase 4), perdront leur raison d'tre. Ce cas
n'est pas hors de question, vu que l'Institut ne r~gle pas non plus les conditions d'immatriculation des aronefs, mais remet aux different pays le
droit de les fixer.
Malgr6 la difference principale des resolutions des dcux corporations,
le resultat pratique pourrait donc se trouver Etre le m.me. Ceci sera le
cas, si tous les pays d6cidaient parcillement de n'admettre A l'immatriculation
que les aronefs appartenant A leurs nationaux. La nationalit6 des aronefs
coinciderait alors toujours avec celle de leurs propri~taires. Naturellement,
chaque Etat devrait dcider que les a6ronefs &trangers se trouvant dans le
pays se fissent enregistrer an consulat de leur pays originaire, en vue de
l'acquisition ou de la confirmation dc leur nationalit6 ou pour acqu6rir la
permission d'exploitation. Cette derni~re condition nous parait indispensable,
ds qu'on fait d6pendre la nationalit6 de l'a6ronef de celle du propri6taire.
II nous parait impossible qu'il soit de la comptence des autorit~s d'un pays,
de conf~rer ou de confirmer la nationalit6 6trang&re A des a6ronefs 6trangers.
Au contraire, on pourrait bien exiger que les consulats remettent . la police
du pays la liste des aronefs Etrangers.

(9)

Theories Based on International Control:

In addition to the eight specific theories for determining nationality of aircraft, it is important to consider other proposals
bearing upon the subject.
A plan for the internationalization of civil aviation was presented by the French delegation to the Disarmament Conference
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of the League of Nations. 168 The object is to place civil aviation,
bombing aircraft, also certain aeronautical material at the disposal
of the League of Nations, or of an international authority which
would be constituted to ensure the cooperation of non-members
of the League of Nations, for the creation of a preventative and
punitive international force and for the protection of civil populations.
The prevalent doctrine today and all the texts of existing
agreements are based on the conception of national aircraft flying through national air space, and not of aircraft subject to the
sovereignty of one nation alone, flying through an air space subject to a common international jurisdiction. This is an essential
factor, according to the survey of the Air Commission of the
League of. Nations, 1 9 since all proposals for the internationalization of civil aviation must either be limited to the provisions of
the existing law or involve the revision of that law. It would
appear to be difficult to reconcile the original text of Article 7
of the Convention of 1919 with several of the proposals made in
regard to the internationalization of aviation, since the latter assumes that the ownership of the machines is shared among persons of different nationality, or that they belong to associations
possessing an international status, or at least to associations of a
less exclusively national character than 'those referred to in the
text, according to the above survey. It continues to state that
it is of interest to note that it was the desire to prevent the use
of civil aviation in war which led the authors of the Convention
of 1919 to adopt that text, which ran counter to other efforts with
the same object in view.
Other proposals were also presented to the League of Nations by which every type of international aeronautical activity
would be subjected to international supervision. For instance, the
aeronautical equipment would, under one plan, become international
and bear the mark of the proposed international supervising body.
Aircraft, under such a plan, would have no nationality, and would
be allocated to the various ports of navigation by the international
authority. The navigating personnel under the plan would be re.garded strictly as international. They would take an oath before
the international authorities, undertaking in particular never to
use their aircraft for military purposes, except in cases laid down
168. League of Nations IX, Disarmament, 1932. IX, 25, Conf. D. 99, p. 23 ;
Consult 3 JOURNAL O
or see Rev. Aeronautique Inter., No. 3 p. 22 (1932).
Am LAW 654 (1932).
169. League of Nations IX, Disarmament, 1932, IX, 43, Conf. D. C. A. 9.
pp. 13, 14, 53.
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by the League of Nations. Military training of such personnel
would be prohibited.
To encourage the operation of foreign companies engaged in
regular international transportation and to procure a less rigorous
enforcement of the sovereign right of state, proposals have been
made to the League of Nations by the Air Transport Cooperation
Committee. 170 The stand was taken that increased international
-cooperation depends largely upon a modification in the strictly
national character of aircraft and upon a decrease in the practice
of subsidizing companies which, in consequence of such government action, tends to assume a political character.
The proposals for internationalization of civil aviation and
-for modification of the present system do not appear to have been
adopted by the League of Nations but they are interesting in the
light of trends in world development away from extreme nationalism and political domination toward world unity.
IV.

RATIONALE

AND

CONCLUSION.

The Nature of Aircraft:
In the general concept of nationality and its application to
persons, corporations, ships and aircraft, there is apparent some
misuse of words and lack of focus of thought. Reality is occasionally lost to view when derivative meanings and analogy have been
resorted to in the development of aeronautical terms and technique. What is the nature of an aircraft as a mechanical device, as
property, as a "personality?" Does an aircraft have "nationality,"
and, if so, how is it acquired and what is the quality and degree
of its nationality? Is nationality an essential attribute of aircraft?
May aircraft have "domicile," and if so, is such domicile determined by location, an act, an intention, and if so, whose location,
act, intention-and so forth? The first step toward an answer
might well be to divest oneself of mental heirlooms and face the
present state of facts.
To the perceptive faculties an aircraft is a machine with power
of locomotion and ascension, having speed surpassing other machines used for the transportation of men and goods. Man's urge
-to go somewhere, everywhere-an impelling energy-led his inventive mind to enlarge his physical person for the accomplishment
of his purpose. Having no fins with which to traverse the water,
170. Sessions May 9-12, 1932. See also, League of Nations IX. Disarmament 1932, IX. 43 cit. note 169, supra, pp. 31-45.
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he used his arms for swimming and extended them with oars.
Later he devised the sail for ships and the propellor for motorboats to increase speed and lessen distance. On land he used
wheels and the strength of beasts. He utilized wind, steam, oil
and electricity to attain velocity astounding the succeeding generations. At last earth's gravity was overcome and man now soars
on high. Instead of the slow and devious pathways enforced by
obstacles on the earth's surface, the flight of aircraft most nearly
approaches a straight line as the shortest route between two points.
These ideas plus action created physical instruments which
in turn were set in motion by man's will and further acts until today man has the most animated means of transportation-the airplane. But strong and swift as may be this machine, it has neither
mind nor will-it has no consciousness.
As the product of scientific invention, aircraft in their physical aspect present many characteristics of water and land vehicles.
Capacity to go on land and sea is not new, but the technique of
aircraft when so manoeuvered varies somewhat from that of navigating ships or motor driving.
Obviously the unique features of aircraft are power of ascension and method of avigation. Aircraft go into the air space
and are immersed in the air as fish are immersed in the sea. They
sustain themselves in an element which, without additional support,
is* inadequate for other types of transport. Motor vehicles and
ships in their respective elements of land and water cannot safely
perform such acrobatics as looping and riding upside down. A
new species of genus machina has been evolved for universal
service.
Annihilation of time and space is popularly credited to the
airplane, yet there is a limit to the flight of aircraft. 17 1 If aircraft
should attempt to emerge beyond the stratosphere, they would find
themselves in another element where they would fail to function
solely as air vehicles. In order to navigate interplanetary space
must not another species of machine be invented to work in a
vacuum as well or better than in the air? Today aircraft can
171. The subject of navigable airspace needs only to be mentioned in this
According to Wenneman, the public right of flight in the navigable
article.
airspace owes its source to the same constitutional basis which, under decisions
of the Supreme Court, has given rise to a public easement of navigation in the
navigable waters of the United States regardless of ownership of the adjacent
or subjacent soil: Wenneman, J. H., Municipal Airports (Cleveland: Flying
Rev. Pub. Co., 1981), Ch. 1.
Sec. 10: NaviSee also, Air Commerce Act of 1926, cit. note 186 ifra,
gable Airspace-As used in this act, the term "navigable airspace" means
airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Secretary
of Commerce under section 3, and such navigable airspace shall be subject
to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation in conformity with the requirements of this act.
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navigate high in air space, and from that vantage point, they may
send forth gliders, but all eventually must descend to earth. Will
the future see rockets shot from aircraft-into the interplanetary
space? Even so, it is conceivable that at whatever point mechanical
improvement would fail, the force of gravity from the nearest
planetary body would inevitably work its nemesis upon man's most
perfect machine. For the waxen wings of Icarus a building was
too high for take-off; for the device of da Vinci, a mountain was
too lofty; if Mars is reached, there are other worlds to conquer!
Possession by man makes these machines his personal property,
as much as any piece of baggage. Since an airplane is too large
an object to carry by a strap-handle, the owner conveniently makes
the machine carry him. Man's ego expands, but does the process
change the nature of the aircraft?
The legal nature of aircraft is discussed by a British authority
as follows

:172

Before going further we may pause to inquire what manner of thing
in the eye of the law an aircraft is. It clearly belongs to the category of
movable property. Ships are movable property, but, from the point of view
of jurisdiction and other matters, they are property of a peculiar kind; they
have a nationality, unlike a caravan or a motor-car, the nationality of the
country in which they are registered, and almost a personality in that actions can be brought against them, that is, in rent, in a court having Admiralty jurisdiction; persons who are, and events which happen, on board a
ship are to a large extent governed by the "law of the flag" of that ship,
that is, the law of the country whose flag the ship carries, sometimes exclusively as in the case of State ships, sometimes concurrently with another
legal system. On the other hand, caravans and motor-cars do not possess
these characteristics. An assault in an English car by one passenger touring in France upon another is just as much subject to French law as if the
car stopped and let them fight it out in an estaminet. An English motor
ambulance is sent to Marseilles to meet a lady who is hurrying home from
India in order to have her confinement in London. The baby is born en route
in France. It is just as much, or just as little, French as if it were born
in a French ambulance or a French hospital. If it had been born on a
P. and 0. liner before reaching Marseilles the "law of the flag" would have
been a, relevant factor, but a motor ambulance has no law of the flag.
Must an aircraft be assimilated to a ship or to a motor-car? The use
of such nautical terms as "airship," "aircraft," "navigation," have led us
into habits, of thought which we might have escaped if we had been able to
173
confine ourselves to terms like "balloons," "flying machines," "aeroplanes."

From a juristic point of view, McNair has no hesitation in
submitting the opinion that the analogy between a ship and an
172. McNair A. *D., The Law of the Air (London: Butterworth & Co.,
pp. 87-112.
178. See also, Laude, Emil, "Comment s'Appellera le Drolt qul Reglra Is
Vie de I'Air?" 1 Rev. Jurldlque Inter. de Ia Locomotion Arlenne 16 (1910).
Ltd., 1932),
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aircraft is fundamentally wrong and misleading, and that the
sooner we eradicate it from our minds the better. "That need not
prevent us," he says, "from borrowing from the law relating to
ships certain useful provisions and applying them to aircraft by
the deliberate process of legislation, but any general attempt to
invest the aircraft, as such and wherever it may be, with the characteristic legal panoply which belongs to a ship will be disastrous."
Support for this view is found in a book on air law published
in 1919174 by a British expert, before the signing of the Air Navigation Convention of that year. Spaight maintains that to assimilate an 'aircraft entirely to a ship and to assign it that full
nationality which historical reasons have attributed to vessels,
so that, in French law and to some extent in British, a ship is a
floating part of the national territory, would seem to be going too
far. He finds more similarity between a flying machine and an
automobile than between the former and a ship, though the analogy
to an automobile is far from perfect.
These observations remain true, in spite of the great development of aviation and of recent air endurance tests, according to
McNair. "The aircraft is not, as a matter of English common
law, a new kind of ship," he states, "but is a piece of movable
property to which certain specific marine characteristics have been
and will be attached by legislation, and which is thereby gradually
developing a legal quality sui generis."
Maritime analogies, apparent and real, are discussed by Dr.
McNair. 7 5 After speaking of shipping terminology applied to aircraft as delusive, he says, "My view is that as a matter of common
law, of the law maritime, and, of existing legislation, the analogy
of the ship has no general application to aircraft. That is to say,
we must not assert that an aircraft is a new kind'of ship, just as
a steamer was once a new kind of ship, and that, therefore, eo ipso
and as a matter of principle, the law relating to ships applies to
aircraft mutatis mutandis. At the same time it has already been,
and will in future doubtless be, convenient from time to time specifically to apply to aircraft' by treaty and by legislation rules
which have been found convenient in the case of ships. It will
not be surprising if we find that such application is more likely
to occur in the case of aircraft operating over or on the sea than
it is in the case of those operating on or over the land."
174.
175.

Spaight, J. M., Aircraft In Peace and the Law, cit. note 155 supra.
McN'air, A. D., The Law of the Air, cit. note 172 stipra, pp. 132-143.
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Preference for comparison between aircraft and automobiles
is voiced by a Swiss authority, Pittard :178
Jusqu'A. ce jour et d'une faqon g~n&ale les juristes ont appliqu6 aux
a&onefs Ia notion de nationalit6; c'est IA une analogie avec le droit maritime.
Nous estimons que c'est une erreur dont nous avons pris nous-m~me
tine large part et qu'il est temps de supprimer. Ne serait-il pas plus logique
d'assimiler l'a&onef A l'automobile ou A la locomotive?
I1 est vrai que
l'automobile comme le chemin de fer circulent sur des routes trac~es et
connues et qu'A la frontire d'un Etat, on peut non seulement verifier la
provenance de l'appareil, mais encore l'emp&her de passer; l'a&onef est
plus semblable au navire qui trace lui-m~me sa route; il ne connait comme
fronti&e que le sol, de m~me que le navire ne realise la fronti&e que par
le rivage. L'assimilation que l'on a voulu faire de l'a~ronef avec le navire
est insuffisante par elle-m~me pour justifier la nationalit6.
La nationalit6 des navires provient de la fiction selon laquelle le navire
constitue une portion flottante du territoire national. L'a&onef &happe A
cette fiction; il a conserv6 son caract&e de meuble et nombreux sont les
juristes qui denient la possibilitE juridique de le grever de droits r&ls.
L'aronef est un objet et ne peut pas Eire consid6r6 comme un sujet de
droit; iln'a de valeur que par celui qui le d6tient on qui en la maitrise et
si l'on devait lui reconnaitre une nationalit6 se ne serait que par l'interm6diaire de son propri~taire ou de son d&enteur. Et 1A encore quelle confusion!
Comment resoudre la question de droit qui se poserait dans le cas on le
propri~taire aurait une nationalit6 diff&ente de celle de l'exploitant; or,
nous devons surtout consid&er l'a&onef comme moyen de communication
plut6t que comme un simple objet de valeur extr~mement variable.
Le but de l'immatriculation n'est pas de cr&r un rapport personnel entre
l'Etat et le propri~taire de l'a&onef, mais de soumettre l'appareil au contr6le
de l'Etat, de fixer son domicile et de lui assurer tine certaine protection; des
diff~rentes personnes qui peuvent intervenir dans le domaine a&onautique
pour l'utilisation ou l'exploitation d'un a&onef, il faut certainement admettre,
du point de vue de la coop&ation des a&onautiques civiles, que c'est l'exploitant qui est la 'plus interess~e et la plus importante.
Comme nous le verrons dans la suite de cet expos6, si nous abandonnons
le crit&e de nationalitl pour prendre celui de domicile, nous supprimons la
difficult6 qui nait de la diff&ence de nationalit6 entre les diverses personnes
qui ont des droits sur l'a&onef.

The cases in which the analogy of the ship is wholly or in
part applied to aircraft are listed by McNair as mutual permission
to enter national air space, nationality, airworthiness, certificates
of competency, ship's papers, cabotage, rules as to lights and signals for air traffic, collisions, crimes, detention of aircraft, and
wreck and salvage. The cases in which the analogy of the ship
is rejected are listed as general average, maritime liens except
176. Pittard, E., Report to Air Transport Co-operation Committee, cit.
note 141 supra.
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as regards certain incidents of a lien for salvage services which
have been expressly applied by Order in Council to aircraft, and
claims for necessaries, including repairs. As to whether an aircraft may be classified as "goods," McNair believes that the peculiar incidents of a sale in market overt could apply to the sale of
a motor car, a wireless set, or an aircraft, and that an aircraft is
"goods" for the purposes of the British Sale of Goods Act,
1893 ;177 he also believes that an aircraft is a personal chattel for
the purposes of the British Bills of Sale Acts of 1878 and 1882,
but in view of the fact that changes in the ownership of a registered aircraft must be notified to the Air Ministry, it is arguable
that Parliament ought to place transfers of registered aircraft
outside the Bills of Sales Acts just as "transfers or assignments of
any ship -or vessel or any share thereof" have been excluded from
the scope of the Acts of 1878 and 1882. He suggests that if the
register of aircraft can be modified so as to record mortgages of
aircraft, there is no reason why that means of notoriety of the
creation of mortgages should not, as in the case of ships, suffice,
but at present the objects of the aeronautical register have nothing
to do with questions of title.
Aeronautical codes of today are incomplete because they follow the modes in aircraft, according to Mandl,'1 78 who points out
that present codes fail in that they do not cover motorless machines, gliders, parachutes, autogiros, and unknown species of flying
machines which may be invented in the future, some of which
might be capable of landing slowly and travelling upon the highways where they would be subject to rules for automobiles. He
is opposed to any rule of registration in order to validate a commercial transaction covering aircraft, which would assimilate aircraft to. real property.
Aircraft are personal property like automobiles, according to
Wegerdt, 179 who pointed out to the International Chamber of Commerce that the right of ownership of aircraft follows the same rules
as the law of ownership of other personal property, especially as
to purchase and sale, or, in other words, it follows the civil law
as to personal property of each country, unless the laws of a country contain special provisions concerning aircraft. He mentions
177. Section 62(1):
"'Goods' include all chattels personal other than
things in action and money, and in Scotland all corvoreal movables except
money...
.
178. Mandl, Vladimir, Address before the Xth International Congress on
Air Law, International Juridical Committee of Aviation, 1 Rev. Gen. de Droit
Aerlen 304 (1932).
179.
Wegerdt, Alfred, "Das Elgentum am Luftfahrzeugen," cit. note 152
4mpra.
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France and Italy,180 where the transfer of ownership of aircraft,
and France and Finland, where the mortgaging of aircraft is controlled by special provisions differing from the civil code. Such
special provisions, stipulating that the transfer of ownership must
be made in writing, which has no validity as to third persons unless it has been recorded in an aeronautical register, in effect makes
registration a proof of ownership of the aircraft, and thus assimilates aircraft in a large degree to real property. Wegerdt finds
this provision objectionable not only because of the difficulty of
making such proof of ownership sufficiently certain, but also because a new restriction would be added under private law to every
transfer which is already restricted in many countries by the rule
of registration according to the nationality of the owner.
The International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts (C. I. T. E. J. A.), encountering different theories for determining the nationality of aircraft, dealt indirectly with the subject of nationality by proposing draft conventions on mortgages
and privileges related to aircraft, also on ownership of aircraft
and the aeronautical register."1 It is proposed that in case the aircraft is encumbered with real charges on the register of one state,
the inscription on the register of another state shall be subject to
proof that the creditors have been paid or have agreed to the transfer of the inscription.
Henry-Cofiannier questions the analogy of aircraft to ships :182
Pourquoi s'obstiner A traiter toujours les deux navigations, a&ienne et
maritime, par analogie? . . . On pouvait, an debut de la science a&onautique, assimiler l'a~ronef A un navire, et pousser jusqu'au bout ce
proc~de. L'a&onef &ait alors I'a~rostat-le v~hicule mecanique n'existant
pas.

In preferring the analogy of aircraft to automobiles, he says
that the "nationality" of automobiles was born the day when free
international circulation was created, but it must be noted that he
wrote the above before the Convention on International Circulation of Motor Vehicles was amended.
Even automobiles had a "nationality" according to indications
in the Convention with respect to the International Circulation of
Motor Vehicles, as follows :188
180. Article 12 of the French law of May 31, 1924, and Article 7 of the
Italian Royal Decree of August 20, 1925.
181. Treaty Information Bulletin No. 40 (Dept. of State, Washington,
D. C., 1933). pp. 33-42. See 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 404, 408 (1933).
182. HenrV-Coiiannier, "De la Nationalit6 et du Domicile des A6ronefs,"
1 Rev. Juridique Inter. de la Locomotion Adrlenne 165, 166 (1910).
183. Article 4 of Convention signed at Paris, October 11, 1909.
Text
printed in Treaty Information Bulletin No. 13 (Department of State, Wash-

ington, D. C.. 1930), p. 27.
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Arrangement of Identification Marks on Motor-CarsNo motor-car shall be allowed to pass from one country into another
unless it carries, fixed in a visible position on the back of the car, in addition to the number plate of its own nationality, a distinctive plate displaying
letters indicating that nationality. .

The word "nationality" does not appear in the International
Convention Relative to Motor Traffic, which modifies the abovementioned Convention on International Circulation of Motor Vehicles of 1909. The later provision reads as follows:18S4
Distinguishing MarkEvery motor vehicle, to receive international authorization to travel on
a road to which the public have access, must carry, in a visible position in
the rear, a distinguishing mark consisting of from one to three letters
written on a plate or on the vehicle itself.
For the purpose of the present Convention the distinguishing mark corresponds either to a state or to a territory which constitutes a distinct unit
from the point of view of the registration of motor vehicles. . .

The word "nationality" does not appear in the Pan American
Convention for the Regulation of Automotive Traffic. The Convention contains the following provision :185
All vehicles before admission to international traffic shall be registered
in the manner prescribed by the state of origin. In addition to the registration plate of the state of origin, each vehicle shall carry a plainly visible
international -registration marker, of the form. and type of plaque markers
provided for by the International Convention for Circulation of Automobiles,
1909, as amended in 1926.

How are aircraft of the United States classified and how far
are they assimilated to ships? Under provision of the Air Commerce Act of 1926,186 "aircraft means any contrivance now known
or hereafter invented, used, or designed for navigation or flight
in the air, except a parachute or other contrivance designed for
.
such navigation but used primarily as safety equipment.
Regisproperty.
personal
are
States
Aircraft in the United
tration and licensing are not required under the federal act, unless
the aircraft is to be used in interstate or foreign traffic. States of
the United States have their respective legislation as to personal
property for taxation and other purposes, including registration
and licensing for intrastate flights.1 87 The main purpose of federal
184. Article 5 of the Convention signed at Paris, April 24, 1926. Text
printed In Treaty Information Bulletin No. 13, cit. note 183 supra, p. 39.
185. Article II of the Convention signed at Washington, October 6, 1930.
Text printed in Treaty Information Bulletin No. 13, cit. note 183 supra, p. 20.
186. Air Commerce Act, 1926. Ch. 344, 44 Stat. L. 568, Sec. 9(c).
187. See, for example, Sec. 2 of the Michigan Public Acts of 1933, No. 169.
For a summary of these licensing requirements, see Landis, R. G., "The National Association of State Aviation Officials: Its Utility and Function," 4
JOURNAL OF AiR LAW 1 (1933).

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

and State legislation is to encourage air commerce and to provide
for public safety.
Personal property as such has no nationality.
It is said in law
to "follow" the owner, and the owner's legal residence or domicile
fixes the legal location of such property. In popular parlance a
man's possessions are frequently described as having the national
character of the country to which the owner belongs; sometimes
they are described according to the manufacture or make. Many
citizens of the United States own imported cars, which are currently known as "French" or "British," as the case may be.
Parts of aircraft may have been imported from one or more
foreign factories to be assembled in one country, or the complete
machine may have been made in one place, but regardless of source
of construction, it is the ownership, by purchase, gift, or otherwise
according to law, that determines the status of personal property
for jurisdictional purposes. It is likewise for ships in the United
States whether or not the ships are registered.
The Air Commerce Act of 1926 provides that the collection
of fines may be effected by a proceeding in rem against the offending aircraft, whether of land or water variety, as well as by an
action in personam, and the rules of admiralty are held to apply.
These provisions are similar to those found in the International
Convention on Air Navigation of 1919. In the opinion of Hotchkiss :188

It is obvious that hydro-aircraft may at times function practically as a
ship and to that end, be subject to admiralty rules. There is also a faint
parallel in many situations between aircraft and ships. -But despite this
similarity it is believed that admiralty rules will be enforced only when
statutory authority demands that this be done. The 'Air Commerce Act
of i926 makes no provision for salvage. It may be argued that the rescuer
of a hydro-aircraft or a balloon'at sea, should be entitled to the rights of
a salvor.' 8 9

As to the application of navigation and shipping laws of the
United States to aircraft, the Air Commerce Act of 1926 states:
Sec. 7(a). The navigation and shipping laws of the United States, including any definition of "vessel" or "vehicle" found therein and including
the rules for the prevention of collisions, shall not be construed to apply
to seaplanes or other aircraft or to the navigation of vessels in relation to
seaplanes or other aircraftOO
188.

Hotchkiss Henry G., A Treatise on Aviation Law (New York: Baker,

Voorhis & Co.,
189. Such
Air Navigation
190. Note

1929), p. 72..
a right Is specifically given In England by Section 11 of the
Act of 1920, 10-11 Geo. V, Ch. 80.
that Section 3 of the Revised Statutes provides that the term

"vessel" when used in an Act of Congress

"includes every description of

water craft or other artificial contrivance used or capable of being used as a

UNIVERSALITY VERSUS NATIONALITY

The legal concept of aircraft as property appears mainly to
support their classification under personalty, the determining relationship being that of ownership by an individual or corporation.
The cases where legislation permits proceedings against aircraft
in rem appear to be for the purpose of facilitating procedure and
securing settlement or reward, rather than assimilating aircraft to
real property. Real property is determined by the fixity of its
location. Comment upon the policy of such exceptions is not
within the purview of this article, unless it bears upon the point
of whether aircraft have individuality or personality in the eyes
of the law to the extent that such individuality or personality
could attract to it the attribute of nationality.
All types of aircraft should have a nationality, according to
Henry-Coiiannier, because the future development of aircraft
manufacture and use of aircraft is impossible to foresee. Different rules for different types of aircraft would lead, in his opinion, into all sorts of entanglements. 191
If nationality be allowed to an aircraft, it should only be a
quasi-nationality, an attenuated nationality, perhaps a conditional
nationality which will come into being, according to Spaight, only
in certain circumstances, as when the aircraft is passing over the
high seas. 92
It has been pointed out that the "personality" and "nationality" of ships registered in the United States, which, if such attributes exist in law, do not compare with those of persons and are
at best of very restricted quality and degree. The so-called maritime
analogy between "nationality" of ships and aircraft appears extremely limited in scope, irrespective of legislation on the subject.
One of the principal claims of ships to possess nationality seems
to be based upon their individuality evidenced by admiralty law
which recognizes proceedings against ships in rem. In the absence
of similar legislation for aircraft, there seems little basis for the
legal personification of aircraft.
Mere ownership is insufficient to confer "nationality" upon
personal property. If it were otherwise, would not objects, whether
means of transportation on water." A similar definition is found In the Shipping Act of 1916 (40 Stat. 900). and Is Incorporated by reference In the MerSeaplanes come within this definichant Marine Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 1008).
tion. The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to prescribe rules for the
Title IV
prevention of collision between vessels and seaplanes (Sec. 2 (e)).
of the Tariff Act of 1922 places seaplanes within the definition of the word
"vessel" and land planes within the definition of the word "vehicle," thus
giving certain jurisdiction over seaplanes to the Secretary of Commerce, and
over aircraft on land to the Secretary of the Treasury.
191. See Part I, 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 1 (1934).
192. Ibid.
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or not similar in nature to aircraft, have legal nationality as objects apart from their respective owners? Instead, a fiction in the
popular mind sometimes causes people to describe an object of
personalty as being of a certain nation because the owner of that
object is a citizen of that country or because the object itself was
manufactured there. As has been previously shown, 9 3 legal nationality is conferred by governments through legislation. Such
nationality falls upon persons and corporations and symbolizes
certain relations between the conferring state and the recipient
person or corporation. The nationality or citizenship received by
corporations is less in kind and degree than that received by persons. The nationality received by persons also varies in kind.
What sort of nationality, if any, have aircraft owned in the
United States?
The United States is not a party to the International Convention on Air Navigation of 1919, and therefore the provisions
and terminology of that Convention as to nationality of aircraft
do not apply to aircraft of the United States.
The Air Commerce Act of the United States of 1926 provides
that if registration is requested, it must be by a citizen. owner of
the aircraft. It does not appear to use the term "nationality" as
1 4
applied to aircraft, but speaks of "aircraft of the United States,"'
and Section 9(f) reads: "The term 'aircraft of the United States'
means any aircraft registered under this act." Section 6 is entitled
"Foreign aircraft" and speaks of "foreign, aircraft not a part of
the armed force of the foreign nation."
The United States is a party to the Pan American Convention on Commercial Aviation of 1928195 and therefore the provisions and terminology of that Convention apply to aircraft of the
United States in so far as such aircraft are affected by that Convention. In Article 7 it is stated that aircraft shall have the nationality of the state in which they are registered.
Bi-lateral agreements of which the United States is a party
offer further evidence of commitment to the idea of nationality
for aircraft. Take as an example the Reciprocal Air Navigation
Arrangement between the United States and Norway, 196 wherein
it states that all aircraft shall carry clear and visible nationality
and registration marks. Ground, therefore, exists for inferring
that the government of the Unitedl States has, for the purpose of
193. See Part I, 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 1, footnote, pp. 7, 8.
194. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, See. 3(c)((d), See. 6 (c), Sec. l1(a).
195. See Part I, 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 1.
196. Reciprocal Air Navigation Arrangement between the United States
and Norway, October 16, 1933, Article 8, 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 135, 137.
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giving effect to such agreements, given some kind of nationality
to aircraft owned and registered in the United States, and
has recognized nationality granted by certain other governments to aircraft owned and registered in their respective countries. Such nationality is determined in the United States by the
owner of the aircraft, who, in order to register the aircraft, must
be a citizen of the United States. In the absence of specific legislation on the subject, in definite terminology, there is room for
discussion as to the kind and degree of such "nationality" as may
have been indirectly conferred upon aircraft by the government of
the United States. At best such nationality would seem to be so
atrophied in character as to be a mere shadow of the prototype
conferred either upon individuals or corporations as citizens of
the United States. Its apparent purpose is mainly to accomplish
identification of the aircraft.
If aircraft are personalty, and if nationality is not transmitted
to personal property through mere ownership, does registration
of aircraft by the owner attract nationality to the aircraft? Some
authorities, as shown above, apparently consider such to be the
case. The above-mentioned agreement between the United States
and Norway would seem to make some distinction between the two
terms "nationality" and "registration." An adequate discussion
of this point would here be too lengthy, for it involves questions
of public safety and security, as well as other motives of a government for requiring registration of aircraft. Comparison, also,
would be interesting in the case of Great Britain, where formerly
registration was demanded of British ships in order to restrict
commerce to British owned vessels, and where today registration
of ships is for purposes of title.
As to legal ownership, Schreiber, in discussing principles of
a draft convention on aircraft, says:'"°
But clearly a person conferring nationality upon an aircraft must stand
in a certain relation to the aircraft, and the problem is essentially one of
determining the legal relations connecting the person and the aircraft.
As to these relations, they must: (a) be governed by private law;
(b) be recognized by the laws of all countries; (c) be susceptible of simple
and clear definition; (d) be of a certain duration; (e) be such as to ensure
the closest legal and economic ties between the person and the aircraft. ...
The principle of ownership, the legal relation accepted at present by the
laws of most countries fulfills the requirements of (a) to (d). But it does
not possess: the characteristic (e) ; and this leads me to believe that a mis197.

Schreiber, Otto, Principles

Aircraft. cit. note 138 supra.

of Draft Convention

on Nationality of
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take was made in choosing the personal nationality of the owner to apply
it to aircraft.
The legal notion of ownership is relatively clear. But from an economic point of view ownership is not at all well defined. Sales subject to
the retention of ownership until payment is complete, the "trustee" of English, law and the various corresponding legal provisions in continental law,
ownership at the place of the security and chattel mortgages, under German law, and long leases of movable objects, all such devices familiar to
modern lawyers have gone far to separate the "owner" from his "possession."
They clearly show that ownership does not present the character of "ensuring the closest economic tie between the person and the
aircraft."

The operator of an aircraft, whether owner, lessee or buyer,
of the aircraft, was Schreiber's choice for determining nationality
of aircraft.19
To support his contention he cites provisions in the
air laws of various countries to show that, by statutory provision,

certain situations in regard to aircraft have been treated from the
economic point of view of the operator rather than of the owner. 1 91

He says:
It is a remarkable fact that the time when the principles of maritime
law were being borrowed to define the nationality of aircraft, shipping in198. See Section III: Theories for Determining Nationality of Aircraft,
(4) and (5) supra.
199. Schreiber, Otto, Principles of Draft Convention on Nationality of
Aircraft, cit. note 138 supra, pp. 5, 6:
-2)
Government aircraft naturally have the nationality of the country
to which they belong. But government aircraft are not defined as aircraft
belonging to a country. Without paying any attention to the question of
ownership the definition of a government aircraft is an aircraft exclusively
used in the service of the State.
"Compare: Argentine, Decree of 80-7-26, Art. 1 ; Chile, Decree of 17-10-25,
Art. 2; Denmark, Law of 1-5-23, Art. 42; France, Decree of 8-7-20, Art. 6
Great Britain, Decree of 20-6-22, Sec. 27 Italy, Decree of 20-8-23, Art. 3
Portugal, Decree of 27-1-27, Art. 2, 3; Spain, Decree of 25-11-9, Art. 23;
Sweden, Decree of 26-5-22, Art. 38 ; Switzerland, Decree of 27-1-20, Art. 34
Venezuela, Law of 16-6-20, Art. 70, 71.
"3)
Air liability is much more stringent than liability under civil law.
But it was felt that it was not only the owner of the aircraft who should be
held liable. For purposes of liability, attempts have been made toidefine the
actual econmic master of the aircraft.
"4)
Thus was established the notion of 'the person having control of the
machine' (Switzerland) and the 'Luftfahrzeughalter'.
"Compare:
Danzig, Law of 9-6-26, Art. 19; Germany Law of 1-8-23,
Art. 19 ; Hungary, Decree of 30-1-22, Art. 19; Netherlands, Law of 30-7-26,
Art. 44, 45; Switzerland, Decree of 27-1-20, Art. 26.
"5)
Other countries have given their preference to the notion of a registered contract of hire, making the lessee exclusively responsible, under the
narne of the 'operator of an aircraft.'
"Compare: Brazil, Decree of 22-7-25, Art. 71 ; Chile, Decree of 7-10-25,
Art. 50; France, Law of 31-5-24, Art. 50.
"6)
Danish Law (Law of 1-5-23, Art. 36) speaks of 'the person for whose
account the aircraft is operated.' Italian law (Decree of 11-1-25, Art. 13, 150,
152, 153) speaks of the 'possessor', which term is also used in the Czechoslovak law (Law of 8-7-25, Art. 7, 29, 41).
English
speaks fifteen
of the days.
lessee of
tract "7)of hire
not law
exceeding
" aircraft and especially of a con"Compare:
Air Navigation Act 1920 part 1, 9; Air Navigation (Consolidation Order 1923), c. 17; Union of South Africa, Law of 1923, Sec. 9.
"8)
The liability of the lessee is laid down in the laws of a number of
American States.
"Compare: Delaware Law of 23-3-23. Sec. 5 ; Hawaii, Law of 1923, Sec.
3895; Idaho, Law of 25-2-25, Sec. 5; Michigan, Law of 23-5-23, Sec. 5 ; Nevada,
Law of 5-3-23, Sec. 5; North Dakota, Law of 5-2-23, Sec. 5; South Dakota,
Law of 24-2-25 Sec. 5 ; Tennessee, Law of 9-2-23, See. 5; Vermont, Law of
26-3-23, Sec. 5; Utah, Law of 28-2-23, See. 5."
(1),
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terests began to find that these same principles of maritime law were no
longer very well adapted to existing economic conditions. It is no less remarkable that in air law very different solutions had been arrived at of
very similar problems.

Regulations for air navigation distinguish between (a) enrollment or registration of aircraft, and (b) navigation permits
showing the airworthiness condition of the aircraft and the qualification of the pilot. In differentiating "registration" from "nationalization" of aircraft, it has been said that the former is for
the purpose of individualizing the machine, whereas, the latter
gives, among other things, indications of the type, volumetric
capacity, carrying load, horsepower, and the location of the aircraft, for the purpose of identifying the relationship of the aircraft to the state.
If the act of registration operates to give to aircraft the nationality of the registering state, it is not easy to discern what
thereby are the advantages to the aircraft received from the state
and the obligations thereby imposed upon the aircraft by the state,
or what thereby are the duties undertaken by the state because
of such resulting nationality. With respect to persons and corporations nationality indicates a certain relationship to the state and
carries with it definite rights and obligations on the part of the
persons, corporations, and the state.
A recent experience concerning the theory of nationality in
proposed legislation is recounted by Judge Brinton :200
This question has presented itself in acute fashion in Egypt, where the
recently proposed air code has been, temporarily at least, rejected because
of difficulty over thisvery point, by the General Assembly of the Court of
Appeals of the Mixed Courts, a body whose approval is required before
legislation can be applied to foreigners. The situation in Egypt brings into
sharp relief the difficulties inherent in the practical application of the ownership-nationality theory introduced in the Convention of Paris of 1919 but
against which there has been directed a steady stream of protest by various
countries, and which resulted in the amendment of 1929, permitting signatory states to adopt other criteria of nationality (such, for instance, as
domicile).
The Egyptian law proposed to confine Egyptian nationality to
all-Egyptian owned aircraft and to refuse the right of circulation over
Egyptian territory to aeroplanes not possessing an accredited foreign na-.
tionality. Egypt is a country where large and highly developed foreign
communities have been established for generations,-in many cases for
centuries. It was at once pointed out that the proposed act might render
it impossible for large classes of foreigners to own and operate aeroplanes
in Egypt, since there was no assurance that it would be either legally or
200. Extract from letter dated September 5, 1933, from Judge Joseph E.
Brinton, of the Cour d'Appel Mixte, Egypt, to Fred D. Fagg, Jr., Director of
the AIR LAW INSTITUTE, Chicago, Illinois.
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practically possible for all foreigners wishing to employ this normal means
of transport, to obtain from their several home governments-or, even having obtained, to maintain the required registrations, and which necessarily
involve compliance with inspection, laws. It was suggested that while some
foreign countries might undertake to arrange for inspections in Egyptthrough consular offices or exchange of courtesies with Egyptian administrative bureaus, others might not be in a position to do so-and that the
result would be to place the foreigner in Egypt-most of whom still enjoy
the protection of the capitulatory right of liberty to circulate and freedom to
trade-in a position of inferiority to the Egyptian himself. Moreover, in
the case of aeroplanes owned by partnerships comprising some foreign
members, it might easily result that no registration was possible anywhere.
The solution to the problem indicated has not yet been found. One
solution would be to allow foreign-owned aircraft to be registered, like
automobiles, and permitted to circulate in Egypt-but without thereby acquiring Egyptian nationality. Another solution would be to substitute for
the ownership test of nationality some other act which would permit such
aircraft to acquire such nationality-as, for instance, the domicile of the
owner in Egypt.

In discussing nationality of aircraft as an error, Mandl says
in part :201
L'Etat d'aujourd'hui repr~sente tine jonction des 6l6ments personnel et
trritoriaux: l'Etat est constitu6 tant par ses citoyens que par son trritoire,
mais il n'est constitu6 que par ces deux agents. Les autres objets ne font
pas d'6lments cr~ateurs, ils appartient seulement A un Etat, sont lies .
celui-ci, soit en raison des personnes, soit en raison de la terre. Les
citoyens et le trritoire selus ktablissent l'existence et l'individualit6 d'un
Etat dans les relations internationales, et la nationalit6 signifie cette participation active A la formation d'une unit6 de valeur internationale. Avoir
la nationalit6, c'est Etre assur6 d'.tre respect6 du point de vne international;
l'Etat seul 6tant un individu internationalement valable, les personnes et la
terre ktant seuls fondateurs de l'Etat, il s'ensue que la nationaliti se trouve
motive exclusivement A propos des personnes ou A propos de la terre ...
Les autres objets ont aussi quelques relations avec l'Etat mais leur
rapport est seulement passif,-ils ne forment aucune uniti de valeur internationale; ils ne participent m~me pas A la formation de celle-ci,--ce rapport
est indirect, il s'effectue par l'interm~diaire des personnes on de la terre:
"Mobilia sequunter personam domini, immobilia sunt obnoxia territorio."
De tels objets n'ont aucune nationalit6, ils sont soumis A la nationalit6 des
tres superieurs qui sont seuls qualifies.
Les aronefs ne font aucune exception parmi les objets non douis de la
nationalit6: selon les articles 6, 7, de la Convention du 13 octobre 1919, on
les a soumis A la nationalit6 de leur propri6taire, "mobilia sequunter personam domini." On les a fait enr~gistrer pour pouvoir mieux les surveiller,
tous les biens, non seulement meubles, mais aussi ceux destin6s A
changer de place, en particulier les moyens de locomotion, pour lesquels,vue leur mobilit6-est augment6e la possibilit6 d'entrer en collision avec des
201. Mandl, Vladimir, "La NationaltO des Adronefs nest qu'une Dnoiination Erron6e." 15 Droit A6rlen 161 (1931).
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. Les marques de l'article 10
sphres extrieures A leur propri6taire
de la Convention ne, sont pas de fi6res banni~res de la nationalit6, mais de
simples stigmates indiquant la qualitE dangereuse.

Mandi gives above a concise presentation of the concept of a
state as composed of and created by the union of two elements,
persons and territory. He points out that objects are only related
to the state either through persons or the land, that only persons
and territory as creators of the state can have nationality, and
that the state as a unit alone has international status. The fact
that personal property follows the owner, in his opinion prevents
objects from having nationality independently of the owner. He
explains the requirement of registration of aircraft as a precaution
for preservation of public safety and as a warning that aircraft
are potentially dangerous instruments, declaring that identification
marks are not "proud banners of nationality."
After analyzing the fundamental nature of aircraft and the
basic relations of aircraft to persons and to the state, nationality
for aircraft seems not only inappropriate but ineffective. The
principle of nationality of aircraft should be discarded. The noticeable trends toward a universal outlook in political, economic and
social spheres, and the growing demands for more freedom in
flight of aircraft seem to point toward a concept of universal or
cultural citizenship for individuals, with localized political affiliation in matters of public safety, police protection, legal jurisdiction
and administration. Some kind of universal certificate of airworthiness for aircraft, based upon a minimum standard, might
be practical if state governments would cooperate in maintaining
efficient inspection services. Such a plan might be made without
an elaborate and dictatorial supervisory body by utilizing the aeronautical bureaus of the respective states, recognizing their responsibility for certifying the minimum standard, and having a general
representative committee to make regulations and review complaints. Local registration would be chiefly for purposes of identification, taxation, and designation of a person to be responsible in
case of need. The naming of a responsible person upon the application for registration would eliminate some of the controversy
about owner, lessee or operator, and so forth, as the test for
"nationality." It is somewhat analogous to registering the name of
an agent with the Secretary of State in the case of a corporation
created in one State and doing business in another. The main
concern of the government registering aircraft is to know where
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to attach the responsibility for aircraft as personal property in
time of need.
Conflict of Laws: Jurisdiction:
McNair discusses the following points :202 (1) how will the
rules of English law determine the country or countries whose national law and jurisdiction govern persons in, and events happening in, an aircraft at any point of time; and (2) in the case of
England, which of two systems of law applicable to persons and
events within its jurisdiction, namely, the common law or the law
maritime, is applicable to the facts under consideration.
In the absence of judicial precedents he refers to the Convention of 1919 for indirect light, quoting Articles 1 and 6. lie
then refers to the British Air Navigation Act of 1920, in which
the preamble recites that the full and absolute sovereignty and
rightful jurisdiction of His Majesty extends, and has always extended, over the air superincumbent on all parts of His Majesty's
dominions and the territorial waters adjacent thereto. Article 1
of the Consolidated Order made under the Act enacts the provisions of the Convention of 1919 as to nationality, Section 14 of
which provides:
(1) Any offense under this Act or under an Order in Council or
regulations made thereunder, and any offense whatever committed on a
British aircraft, shall, for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, be deemed
to have been committed in any place where the offender may for the time
being be.
(2) His Majesty may, by Order in Council, make provision as to the
courts in which proceedings may be taken for enforcing any claim under
this Act, or any other claim in respect of aircraft, and in particular [may
confer jurisdiction upon any court exercising Admiralty jurisdiction].
kItalics added.) 203

Subsection (3) of Section 14 applies section 692 of the British
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, with the necessary modifications,
to the detention of any aircraft in any circumstances in which a
ship may be detained by official action under that section. McNair
says that at the time of writing the only exercise by the Crown of
the power conferred by subsection (2) above quoted consists of
the Order in Council as to Wreck and Salvage.
The Consolidated Order made under the Act states that the
provisions of the Order apply, unless the contrary intention appears:
202.
203.

McNair A. D., The Law of the Air, cit. note 172 supra p, 87.
Ibid., p. 88.
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(a) To all British aircraft registered in Great Britain and Northern
Ireland wherever such aircraft may be;
(b) to other British aircraft and foreign aircraft when such aircraft
are in or over Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
and for the purposes of liability under this Order, other than liability for
want of registration, where an aircraft is not registered, and by reason
thereof has no nationality for the purposes of this Order, this Order shall
apply to such aircraft when flying within Great Britain and Northern Ireland in like manner as it applies to aircraft registered in Great Britain
and Northern Ireland.

Having thus summarized the law of Great Britain as to the
main statements of principle, McNair indulges in theory regarding
the places in which an aircraft may find itself, as follows: on
land, on tidal and non-tidal inland waters, on territorial waters,
on the high seas, or above any of these places, and the same list
of locations in the case of aircraft in a foreign jurisdiction. He
classifies aircraft as British when registered in Great Britain or
Northern Ireland, other British aircraft, foreign aircraft and stateless aircraft, the latter being assimilated to registration in Great
Britain and Northern Ireland.
The legal systems which ought to apply to the several categories of legal, events, crimes, torts, contracts, quasi-contracts,
salvage, births, deaths, marriages, making of wills and conveyances
of property, and so forth, occurring upon each of the three classes
of aircraft above mentioned when in the various locations, are
discussed by McNair. As to collisions between aircraft in the air
he believes that when the collision occurs above land, including
inland waters, the common law court exercising jurisdiction over
the subjacent land or water will have jurisdiction as it has in the
case of a collision between two vehicles on the road, but when it
occurs over water upon which an admiralty court would have
jurisdiction in the case of torts committed upon or in the water,
he believes that the admiralty court would have jurisdiction. But
he submits that there is nothing in such a collision per se to attract
the maritime law, that the court would apply the common law
relevant to an action based on negligence, and that the action is
in personam and not in rem. When an aircraft is manoeuvering
under its own power on the water, it is required by Consolidated
Order to conform to the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea, and, for the purposes of these Regulations it is deemed to be
a steam-vessel, except as to lights and sound signals. McNair does
not think that this means that the aircraft becomes a steam-vessel
for any other purposes, such as that of attracting the admiralty
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procedure in claims brought against its owners or the special rules
administered by admiralty courts in dealing with collisions between
ships. Apart from the Consolidated Order he suggests there are
circumstances in which an admiralty court would take jurisdiction,
such as in the case of collision damage done to an aircraft by a
ship upon water over which an admiralty court would have jurisdiction where damage is done by one ship to another ship, that
the maritime law applies, that a maritime lien can attach to the
ship and an action could lie in ren. Also in the case of collision
damage done by an aircraft to a ship which is upon water over
which an admiralty court would have jurisdiction in the case of
damage done by one ship to another, an admiralty court would have
jurisdiction, maritime law would apply, no maritime lien could
attach, and the action would be in personam and could not lie in
rem.
One of the most important consequences of the assumption
that an airship cannot be assimilated to a ship is, according to McNair, to deny to events taking place on board an aircraft that
peculiar association with the state of the flag carried by a ship,
sometimes loosely expressed, as he says, in the misleading fiction
that a ship is deemed to be a floating part of the territory whose flag
she carries. "It is true that aircraft, like ships, can have a nationality," declares McNair, "but my submission is that their nationality does not, like the nationality of ships, possess the peculiar legal
quality of attributing to events happening on board an aircraft
the locality of the State in which it is registered."
In cases of births, deaths and marriages occurring in an aircraft over land, on inland or territorial waters, he maintains that
an English court will apply the law of the subjacent state, regardless of the nationality of the aircraft, to determine the legal consequences, and will treat them as if they had occurred on the subjacent land or water. When an aircraft is over or on the high seas
and a birth occurs in the aircraft, the legal effect is discussed by
McNair as follows :204
Persons "born within His Majesty's dominions and allegiance" are, by
the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Acts, 1914 to 1922, naturalborn British subjects. Among the extensions of this rule are "any persons
born on board a British ship whether in foreign territorial waters or not,"
but for the reasons already given I am not prepared to assimilate an aircraft, even a seaplane, to a ship for this purpose. It is probable that the
rule also includes persons born in foreign territory occupied by British
troops among natural-born British subjects. So much for :he jus soih. But
204.

Ibid., pp. 107-108.
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by section 1(1) (b) of the Act of 1914, as amended in 1918 and 1922, applying the jus sanguinis, natural-born British subjects also include "any person born out of Mis Majesty's dominions, whose father was, at the time
of that person's birth, a British subject," and who fulfils certain other conditions of which one is the registration of his birth at a British Consulate
within one year. It is difficult to see how a person born in an aircraft on
or over the high seas can become a natural-born British subject jure soii;
he is born out of the King's dominions and His Majesty cannot be said to
be in occupation of the part of the world in which he is born. It seems,
therefore, that it is only jure sanguinis, that is, as the child of a British
subject who satisfies the conditions of section 1(1) (b) of the Act of 1914,
amended as aforesaid, that a person born in an aircraft on or over the high
seas can be a natural-born British subject. So a child of French parents
born on a British airship over the high seas would appear to be French
only and not both French and British.
As to marriages in an aircraft on or over the high seas, McNair says that he is not prepared to apply, eo ipso, and as a matter
of common law, the same law as that applied to marriages on board
a ship.
Fixing the venue of offenses committed or of contracts entered into on board an aircraft in transitu during an international
flight presents interesting problems. An illustration of venue in
the case of an offense committed upon a railroad train or watercraft passing through several political subdivisions in the United
States has thrown some light on the subject. In the absence of
constitutional limitations, legislation in States of the United States
permitting the venue of criminal prosecution for offenses committed in or upon public conveyances, such as railroads or watercraft in transitu, in a county [political subdivision of a State of the
United States] other than the county in which the crime was actually committed, but through which the public conveyance passed,
would appear to be valid. Such statement was based on the theory
that it is competent for legislatures to change or modify the common law principle that venue must be proved as laid. 20 5 In the
State of Illinois, even where the Constitution provides for trial
by jury in the county or district in which the offense is "alleged"
to have been committed, it has been held that statutes are constitutional providing that the local jurisdiction of all offenses not
otherwise provided for by law shall be in the county where the offense was committed, but that where any offense was committed in
or upon any railroad in the State or on any watercraft navigating
any of the waters within the State, and when it cannot be readily
determined in what county this offense was committed, the of205.

Watt v. People, 126 Ill. 9, 18 N. E. 340, 11 A. L. R. 1020 (1888).
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fense may be charged to have been committed and the offender
tried in any of the counties through or along or into which such
railroad or watercraft may pass or come, or can be reasonably
determined to have been, on or near the day when the offense was
committed, the theory being that the constitutional right is with
respect to the place alleged as the locus of the crime. The court
said :208
It thus became a settled rule of the common law that persons accused
of criminal offenses should have a righ' to be tried by a jury of the visne
of the alleged crime. Though originally more limited, the visne or neighborhood came to be understood to be the county where the offense was
committed, and such was its signification at common law at the time that
system of jurisprudence was adopted in this state. 1 Chitty, Crim. Law, 177;
3 Reeves, History of Eng. Law, 476; 4 BI. Com. 349. Undoubtedly the
right to a trial by jury of the county in which the crime charged was committed is ordinarily a substantial and important legal right. It secures to
the accused a trial among his neighbors and acquaintances, and at a place,
where, if innocent, he can most readily make that fact to appear. But it is
difficult to see how that can be the case where the offense is committed
on a railway train, and the circumstances are such that it cannot be definitely located in any one of several counties through which the train passes.
Those who were on the train are, for the time being, completely segregated from the communities through which they are rapidly passing, and
there is ordinarily no circumstance which can make it more advantageous
for a person accused of such a crime to be tried in one county than in
206. Watt V. People, cit. note 205 supra. The Illinois statute, permitting the venue of crimes committed upon trains while in transitu to be
laid in any county along the route was again applied in People v. Goodwin,
263 Ill. 99, 104 N. E. 1018 (1914), its constitutionality, seemingly, being
assumed.
Where the Constitution guarantees a trial by jury of the "county" or
"district" wherein the offense shall have been committed, it has been held
that the venue of criminal prosecutions is not restricted to the county where
actually committed. Thus, in State v. McDonald, 109 Wis. 506, 25 N. W. 502
(1901), the court, proceeding upon the theory that the word "district" must be
considered as having a different meaning than the word "county," held that
a statute providing that counties on the shores of certain state waters should
have Jurisdiction in common of all offenses committed on such waters, was
constitutional.
In the New York case of People v. Downing, 84 N. Y. 478 (1891), the court,
in applying a statute which provided that an indictment for any crime or
offense in respect to freight in transttu on a railroad train might be found
in any county through which such train might have passed, said that such
a statute, while it changed the common law rule, was "in the power of the
leg!slature," but no other reference was made to the question of its constitutionality.
And, in a number of instances, statutes of the kind under consideration
have been applied by the courts without the question of their constitutionality
having been expressly referred to in any way. In this class may be mentioned
Nash v. State. 2 0. Greene (Ia.) 286 1849), which construed and applied
a statute providing that when a person shall commit an offense on board of
any vessel or float, he may be indicted for the same in any county through
any part of which such vessel or float may have passed on that trip or voyage;
People v. Hulse, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 309 (1842), which involved a similar statute;
Com. v. Brown, 71 Pa. Super. Ct. 575 (1919), which applied a statute providing that the venue of offenses committed during journeys shall be In any
county through which the carrier traveled during the time the felony or
misdemeanor shall have been committed ; Req. v. Sharpe, 6 Cox. C. C. (Eng.)
418 (1854), Dears, C. C. 415, 24 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 40, which applied 7 Geo.
IV. Ch. 64. see. 13, a similar statute: and Reg. v. French, 8 Cox C. C. (Eng.)
252 (1859), which involved the statute cited with the next preceding case,
11 American Law Reports 1022.
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another. The right in such case to a trial in a particular county, if it
exists at all, is at best a technical right, having no substantial importance
or value to the accused. . . . The phraseology of that section of our
present Constitution which related to the place of trial in criminal prosecu.tions differs materially in one respect from that of the corresponding provisions of the Constitutions of 1818 and 1848. The Constitution of 1818
provided that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused should have a right
to "a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage;" and the
Constitution of 1848 provided that he should have a right to "a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense
shall have been committed." It must be admitted, probably, that both these
constitutional provisions were susceptible of but one construction, viz., that
of limiting jurisdiction in all criminal prosecutons absolutely to the county
where the crime alleged was actually committed. The framers. .of our
present Constitution, recognizing, as we may assume, the infirmity of this
rule, particularly in its application to cases like the present, where it is
impossible to determine in which of two or more counties a particular
crime was committed, revised the section so as to make it read as follows:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to . . . a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed." The modified phraseology
may fairly be regarded as evidencing an intention to relax in some degree
the rigid rule formerly prevailing. The prosecution may now be had in
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. The allegation here referred to is doubtless that made by the indictment, that being the only document in which the proper allegations as
to the vicinage of the crime are ordinarily made. The Constitution then
may be regarded as empowering the general assembly to provide, in its
discretion, for the presentment of indictments in which the allegations as
to the vicinage of the offense may not be in accordance with the actual
fact. If this is not so, the words inserted in the present Constitution are
meaningless, and the instrument must be interpreted precisely as though
they had not been used. While at common law, and by the rule established by both our former constitutions, criminal offenses were regarded as
strictly local and subject to prosecutions only in the counties where they
were committed, our present Constitution vests in the general assembly the
power to change that rule to such extent as it may see proper. It may now
determine by law when offenses are to be deemed to be local, and when and
within what limitations they are to be treated as transitory.
The following British cases throw light upon the question of

venue :207
Reg. v. FrenchTHE RECORDER.-I think that by the combined operation of the 7 Geo. 4,
c. 64, and the Central Criminal Court Act, this -indictment is properly preferred and tried in this court. There is here but one journey, and although
the carriages are distinct, they'all form but one conveyance. The fact that
207. Reg. v. French, cit. note 203 supra (Assault, venue, offense comReg. v. Sharpe, cit. note 203 supra (Larceny,
venue, carriage passing through different counties).

mitted in course of journey);
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the prosecutrix and the defendant rode in different carriages after the assault was committed does not appear to me to affect the question. It is the
same as if they had occupied different parts of one and the same carriage.
As to the interpretation sought to be put on the words, "through which
any carriage shall have passed," I cannot think it has any foundation. The
words clearly speak with reference to the time of the trial, and not to the
time when the actual offense was committed. Any place within the limits
of the beginning and end of this journey may be taken to be the venue, in
whatever part of the journey the assault took place.
Reg. v. Sharpe & anotherJERVIS, C. J.-There can be no doubt about that. The provision is quite
general; it applies to "any carriage whatever employed in any journey."
The object of the enactment is clear enough. If property is stolen (luring
a journey, it may in many cases be quite impossible for the prosecutor to
ascertain at what part of the journey the offense was committed. The
statute, to get rid of that difficulty, provides that the offender may be
indicted in any of the counties through which the carriage passed in the
course of that journey.

As to conflict of law and jurisdiction of the courts in matters
concerning aircraft, Schreiber 2 0 expressed the following views,
which appear to have points in common with maritime law in that
the nationality of an aircraft would attract the law of the state of
the aircraft's nationality:
1)

Lex loci .actus.

(a) During an air voyage whether or not it extends beyond the
boundaries of a single state, the lex loci actus is the law of the state of the
aircraft's nationality.
In theory a distinction has hitherto been made between an air voyage
within the boundaries of a single state and an air voyage extending beyond
them. Regulations based upon such distinction would be so complex as to
give rise in practice to many difficulties.
(b) The law of the country of the aircraft's nationality is to be applied whenever territorial law would normally be applied.
(c) "Air voyage" and "extend beyond the boundaries of a single State"
will have to be defined in the draft Convention. Such definitions will be
entirely independent of those given for "national voyage" and "international
voyage" in internatioal law governing air transport contracts.
2)

Jura in re.

(a) In connection with property and other rights over things, the aircraft is everywhere governed by its national laws.
This rule is subjected to the general principles governing the application of foreign laws.
(b) Distraint and other similar legal acts are performed under the
authority of the laws of the court having jurisdiction.
3) Jurisdiction of the Courts.
The Jurisdiction of the Courts is governed by civil law. But in cases
208.

Schreiber, Otto, Principles of Draft Convention on Nationality of

Aircraft, cit. note 138 supra.
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where the aircraft's national law is applicable the case may be brought before the Courts of the country of the aircraft's nationality. The Courts of
the place where the aircraft is registered will always have jurisdiction.
This rule in nowise affects the jurisdiction of other Courts either of the
country of the airship's nationality or of foreign countries.
On the question of jurisdiction, Fauchille wrote

:209

M. de Bar fait sur l'article 13 de mon projet l'observation suivante:
"II n'est pas exact tous les actes passes A bord-d'un arostat doivent tre
jug~s selon la loi du pavillon de l'arostat. Je crois que simplement les
r~gles du droit international priv ou penal doivent itre appliqu~cs et qu'on
doit 6tablir seulement que I'arostat en l'air fait partie du t6rritoire de
l'Etat dont il a le droit de porter le pavilion, tant qu'il n'est pas en contact
avec le sol de cet Etat."
Quoiqu'en pense M. de Bar, je suis sur ce point en parfaite communion
d'ides avec lui. En effet: 10 Mon article 13,
.
ne s'occupe que des
actes passes A bord des arostats dans l'espace
.
dans un a6rostat
lorsque celui-ci est A terre, il n'y a rien que soit special au regimes des
machines ariennes et on n'a qu'A appliquer les r~gles du droit commun
2' En ce qui concerne les actes passes dans l'atmosphre a bord d'un
arostat, l'article 13 de mon projet n'attribue pas pour tous ces actes competence A la justice et A la loi du pavilion, puisque son alin~a 2 reserve aux
tribunaux et aux lois de lEtat trritorial "les actes portant atteinte au droit
de conservation de l'Etat sous-jacent on qui causent un dommage A son
trritoire ainsi qu'aux biens on aux personnes de ses habitants."
Escape from contact with the land by aircraft from the place
of departure to the place of landing, together with the fact that
while en route aircraft are comparatively free from supervision
by police and other authorities of the state, form the chief reason
for using the analogy of ships on the high seas to grant jurisdiction over civil and criminal acts taking place on board an aircraft
in flight. Such analogy would place jurisdiction in the state which
gives "nationality" to the aircraft, diplomatic protection by the registering state thus following the course of the aircraft. Even with
modern motor cars, police protection is a difficult problem on land,
because automobiles pass rapidly through county, State, and even
international boundaries. Offenders are apprehended usually when
and where the car stops, but abandonment of the car frequently
aids escape.
Commenting on misdemeanors and crimes on board aircraft,

Visscher said :210
209.

Fauchille Paul, "Le

Wtglme

Juridique

des

A~rostats,"

Rapport

a

lInsttut de Droit International (Session de Madrid. 1911). l'Annuaire de
l'Institut de Droit International 1, XXIII et XXIV; 2 Rev. Inter. de la Locomotion AMrienne 145 (1911).
210. Visseher, Ferdinand de, "Le Regime Juridique Atmospheric et la
Question de la NationalttO des Mronefs," cit. note 160 supra.
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La loi competente pour la repression de ces crimes et d~lits [commis
A bord et n'atteignant le t~rritoire d'aucun Etat] est la loi nationale de
l'a~ronef. Tel est le principe adopt6 A la fois par un parti important de ]a
doctrine et par diverses associations scientifiques. II a &6 consacr6 par
l'article 10 de la loi fran aise precit~e, tout au moins en cc qui concerne
les crimes et d~lits commis A bord d'a6ronefs itrangers. Le recours A la
notion de nationalit4 de l'aronef pr~sente a priori des avantages pratiques
certains en cette mati~re. Mais la valeur du syst~me se trouve absolument
compromis6 par le mode de d~termination de la nationalit& . . . Et c'est
bien pourquoi la loi franqaise, qui abandonne A la loi nationale des a~ronefs
itrangers ]a repression de ces crimes et dlits, s'est gard~e de proclamer sa
competence pour les m~mes faits commis A bord d'a6ronefs franCais en
dehors du trritoire national.
Le vice de cette application de la loi nationale pour la determination de
la loi competence est ici particuli~rement apparent. II n'y a aucun lien
logique ou normal entre la nationalit6 du propri~taire, dont la qualification
nationale de l'aronef n'est que le signe exterieur, et les inter~ts qui justifient I'attribution d'une comptence repressive A tin Etat en particulier.
La nationalit6 de l'a~ronef est ici une donn~e sans valeur parce qu'elle est
command~e par une circonstance indiffrente au point de vue de la d6termination de la loi comp6tente.

Visscher also said:2'1
la notion de nationalit6 des aronefs n'est apr~s tout, en ces
mati~res, qu'une abstraction commode, mais non pas indispensable. Rien
n'emp~che la loi ou la doctrine de remonter directement aux circonstances
de fait qui justifient tant6t certaines pr~somptions de volont6, tantot Finterkt spcial d'un Etat A l'application de ses lois d'ordre public.

His suggestion for jurisdiction during an international journey
is not to apply the law of the country of the parties or of the state
registering the aircraft, but to give jurisdiction to the state upon
whose territory the aircraft first alights after the commission of
the misdemeanor or crime in question. On this point he cites
the codes of France and Belgium. For jurisdiction over contracts
taking place during flight he prefers the application of the law of
the state of the aircraft's port d'attache. In regard to corporations
carrying on international transportation he maintains that the operating headquarters of a corporation (si~ge social) gives .the corporation a contact in connection with crimes which would solve
the question of jurisdiction without going into the nationality of
the corporation, for which latter problem he finds no solution.
12
Mandl discusses rights apart from the owner of the aircraft.2
For acts on board during flight he prefers the jurisdiction of the
211. Ibid.. p. 22. See also, French Code. Art. 5, 7; Art. 10, par. 2, French
Law of May 31, 1924; Belgian Code, Art. 6-14.
212. Mandl, Vladimir, Address before the Xth International Congress on
Air Law, cit. note 178 supra.
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subjacent state, as if the act were done in that state (locus regit
acturn). He cites Article 1 of the International Convention on
Air Navigation of 1919. He advocates diplomatic protection only
through the nationality of the owner of the aircraft (status personal), or as a result of acts done by enrollment on a register at
the owner's domicile (status loci). On the high seas, if no rules
of private international law allow, he suggests the analogy used in
218
all other gaps of the law.
While ships have some extraterritorial prerogatives, Mandi
points out that the analogy to ships advocated by Fauchille was
not accepted, because the theory of freedom of the air was rejected. During the war rights of ships were restricted, and even
such restricted rights were not given to aircraft after the war.
He cites an exception in Article 32 of .the Convention of 1919
wherein a military aircraft may benefit from privileges granted to
foreign war batiments.
Before the use of an aircraft is authorized by a state, a certificate of airworthiness must be issued and the aircraft must be
entered in the official register. The main purpose of the register
is, according to Oppikofer, administrative. It serves in the first
place the requirements of the traffic police, but, he says, this does
not prevent various countries from also using the register for
promulgating and establishing certain private rights to aircraft
(title, mortgage) .214 He believes that explanation of the requirement of registration according to the nationality of the owner as
based upon rules of maritime law concerning registration of vessels may have been true of the earliest attempts to construct
a theory of air law, but he states that it cannot explain a legal
clause which has been applied with such persistence by the legislation of the majority of countries :215
It is, in the last resort, political considerations which are here paramount. In so far as the state does not impose restrictions upon itself
through international treaties, it desires in principle to reserve its -territory to the aircraft of its own nationals, and in this way to give them
precedence over foreign owners of aircraft. It has frequently been pointed
out in recent times that, while regulations of this kind have very few
positive advantages, their negative effect is to impede international air
traffic. They do not insure the protection of national interests. Aerial
213.

The international rules for the prevention of collisions of ships con-

tain provisions not suitable for aircraft: 26 Stat. 320; 28 Stat. 82; 29 Stat.
381, 85: 31 Stat. 30; and 34 Stat. 850.
214. Oppikofer, Hans, "International Commercial Aviation and National
Administration," Enquiries into the Economic, Administrative and Legal Situation of International Air Navigation, League of Nations, VIII. Transit. 1930.
VIII. 6. p. 101.
215. Ibid., p. 103.
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espionage, for example, is just as practicable from aircraft belonging to a
national. Regulations which consist in registering only aircraft belonging
to nationals become an administrative absurdity in cases where international conventions oblige the state to permit the passage of foreign aircraft over its territory.

In observing that nearly every! country has recognized the
legal principle that aircraft acquire, by registration, the nationality
of the registering state, Oppikofer says that the legal importance
of this nationality is shown mainly by the fact that, in international
private law, administrative law and penal law, it is regarded as
the determining factor in applying national rules.,"
A state's concern for the welfare of its inhabitants is its excuse for being. This involves trusteeship in the interest of public
safety, under which comes the exercise of licensing authority and
supervision over things and acts of potential danger. The destructive range of aircraft is the greatest of any modern instrument. Aircraft not only in the ordinary course of events threaten
the safety of man's daily life, but in emergencies commercial
planes can be rapidly equipped for military purposes to drop
heavy bombs to destroy persons and property, or spread poison
gas to kill the populations of cities. The usual dangers from aircraft are provided against by certificates of airworthiness and registration of the aircraft, licenses for pilots, police surveillance and
other precautions on the part of governments. The possibility of
the greatest hazard, war, and its potential use of civil aircraft,
forms an undercurrent in nearly all legislation and conventions
concerning air navigation.
The reverse side of the menacing picture depicts the constructive possibilities of aeronautics in developing trade, transport, com.
munication, and in carrying out health and police regulations, air
mail, assistance to agriculture, as well as many other services which
lead civilization into a more unified world.
A state exists only so long as it retains its component partsterritory and nationals. If one state attempts or appears to attempt to acquire more territory or to foster inordinate economic
gain, rumors of war arise and nationalism becomes rampant. Science, instead of producing instruments to promote peaceful pursuits, devises destructive inventions to aid in the more rapid disintegration of material possessions and human institutions. Man's
216. Ibid., p. 105.
Note:
Oppikofer believes that the adoption of the
nationality of aircraft as a criterion, must in international law, often lead to
unsatisfactory soluttoris, when the nationality of aircraft is determined not
by the aerodrome where the machine is stationed or by the nationality of the
operator, but by Its registration and, therefore, indirectly by the nationality
of its owner.

UNIVERSALITY VERSUS NATIONALITY

struggle for existence in a materialistic civilization tends to obliterate his opportunities for an inward or spiritual civilization
and for the development of moral education. The recognition
that war connotes error, destruction and decomposition will turn
man's consciousness, mind, and will away from exploitation toward
freedom for individuals and nations to realize their highest aspirations.
Plans for civil aviation and for aerial warfare are incompatible because they are based upon opposite principles, the one
unifying and constructive, the other disintegrating and destructive.
By turning vengeance into channels of the law for punishment
of a wrong-doer, there evolved the ethical difference between retaliation in kind against an offender, or an offending instrument,
and opportunity offered to an offender for reform, together with
compensation to the person injured. By the metamorphosis of national egoism and aggression into moderation and cooperation a
way could be made clear for the greatest development of civil aviation and for simplified judicial or arbitral settlement of claims arising therefrom. At the same time various incentives for war would
eliminate themselves with surprising ease. If, however, the choice
of the world is, even unwillingly, toward war, states raise the standards of strong nationalism. The aggressive features of nationality
permeate legislation and become affixed to. such situations as the
present so-called nationality of aircraft.
Separate plans for normal times and for unusual times of
emergency or war would seem to be the wiser course. In case
of war, history usually reveals immediate stoppage of peace time
regulations. This being so, a government could, upon declaration
of war, commandeer all aircraft within its borders, and checking
the registered aircraft it could utilize or sequester aircraft according to its laws for personal property of nationals and aliens. The
effectiveness of such a manoeuvre on the part~of the government
would largely depend upon the efficiency of its administration of
civil aeronautics and its police.
It seems almost futile to struggle over definitions and specifications for different types of aircraft for use in peace and war.
All types have duality, the choice depending upon the guiding hand
of man. A bomb may be carried in any aircraft-or in a suitcase. World restrictions in manufacture and limitations in output call for super-human intelligence and insight, together with
infallible administration. Had restrictive policies been applied
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to motor cars, would the industry have attained its present growth
and would the use of automobiles have been so universal?
The only aircraft which appear rightfully to have any direct
claim to a nationality are the aircraft owned by national governments and employed in the service of those governments for purposes of peace and war. Such nationality, however, is derivative
in the same sense that an airplane, privately owned, may be said
to have a nationality reflected from its owner. A national state,
as a corporation, may possess personal property. Such property
is said to be publicly owned and to belong indirectly to the individuals who compose the state. The United States, as a national
government owning and operating aircraft, would appear to endow
such aircraft with a national character more precisely than an individual citizen of the United States could endow his privately
owned machine with a national character. Yet in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the latter are spoken of as "aircraft of the
United States."
A modern national state is an artificial being, a corporation
created by natural persons and founded upon territory. It may
be said to have "reality" independently of its component parts,
i. e., people and land. This "reality" has the fiction of a "personality" which acquires the attribute of nationality. This nationality the state shares with its territory, and, under specified conditions, with certain natural and artificial persons, i. e., its "nationals" and corporations created by the state. It is this reality
of the state as a unit which enters into relations with other national
states.
International relations need only brief analysis in this article.
They may be said to fall generally into political, economic and
social divisions, which in the world today have reached a climax
of complexity and tension and of uncertain balance between peace
and war.
The concept of nationalism originally offered liberty and opportunity to individuals, together with security of person and
property, but today, on the contrary, there are indications that the
administration of nationalism is hindering the development of individuals and lessening their security. This appears to be due to
the fact that many politically nationalistic minds hold tenaciously
to governmental precedents which have been outgrown by economic and social progress. A self-contained state is as much of
an anomaly in modern times as is a "subsistence homestead" in an
industrial community. Interdependence of nations in supplying the
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needs of their inhabitants, and at the same time the ascending
importance of individuals as factors in the social fabric, call for
changing concepts on such subjects as government, property, education and even religion.
"In the near future it may be possible to fly over countries
at altitudes which will make sovereignty an empty word because
all control will be illusory," writes Bouch6.211 He continues:
Doubtless- the defensive reaction against this violation, which is today
scarcely perceptible, will be greatly intensified: nationalism in the air will
be all the more vehement because it will be obviously against the nature of
things. International cooperation, in the air is necessary and will therefore
be particularly difficult because compulsion-even the compulsion of nature
-is never willingly endured.
The problem of the hour

.

.

.

is neither technical nor economic, but

purely political. Before anything can be done, there must be the will in
political circles to pay heed, in a spirit as 'international as air traffic itself,
to the technical and economic realities by which this mode of transport is
limited.

The principle of territoriality is discussed by Oppikofer in
part as

follows:218

One-and perhaps the most important-element of uncertainty in international aerial law and traffic as they exist today is the principle of territoriality, that is to say, the principle which subjects the aircraft, its crew
and its.passengers to the legal regime of the state flown over. Unless the
domestic legislation of the state flown over makes a distinction between
foreign aircraft and national aircraft, all the legal rules of the private,
penal and administrative law of that state apply to aircraft flying over its
territory.
The formula which expresses territoriality is found in the great majority of air .navigation Conventions, but its meaning and wording are not
always the same, and its interpretation is sometimes very questionable ...
The main source of all competence of the state flown over would seem
to reside in the police regulations . . . the necessary preventive measures
against nationals and foreigners whenever public order and security are
threatened

. .

.

a never-failing means of intervention and one which is,

in fact scarcely open to attack from the point of view of international law.

Jurisdiction is an important subject in international civil aviation and is at the base of several arguments for nationality of
aircraft. Geographically speaking, and taking into account. the
present sovereign rights of states over their respective territories
and territorial waters, there might be comparatively little difficulty
217. Bouchd, M. H., "Present Economic Conditions of Civil Air Navigation," Enquiries into the Economic, Administrative and Legal Situation of International Air Navigation, League of Nations, VIII. Transit. 1930. VIII. 6,
p. 81.
218. OPPIkofer, Hans, "International Commercial Aviation and National
Administration," cit. note 214 supra. pp. 121 and 127.
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in determining the competent court, if a method could be agreed
upon applicable in the cases where the aircraft is upon or above
parts of the earth's surface iot subject to the sovereignty of any
state or where doubt arises as to the exact location of an aircraft
at the moment an event in question took place on board, or where
an aircraft escapes detection of the subjacent state. This would
be chiefly upon or above the high seas and crossing national
boundaries.
Owners and lessees, in undertaking international flights for
their aircraft, voluntarily submit such aircraft, their personal property, to the jurisdiction of the states flown over. Passengers in
such aircraft likewise submit themselves to those jurisdictions.
Should anything happen to an aircraft or its passengers in or
above any one of those states, the law of that state applies and
its courts have jurisdiction, provided the place and time of the
event in question can be reasonably determined in relation to the
territory or territorial waters of that state.
In cases involving doubt as to the exact location of the aircraft, since there has already been, by the owner or lessee of the
aircraft and by the passengers, voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of all states flown over, none can reasonably object to the
jurisdiction of any state flown over. Therefore, it could be made
possible in doubtful cases, for stipulations to be entered into as
to which state should take jurisdiction. Such provision could be
arranged by international agreement.
In matters of contract executed during flight where stipulations as to jurisdiction were not written into the document, or
in torts or crimes committed in aircraft when the exact location
cannot be readily determined, a logical and feasible place for jurisdiction to attach is the state in which the aircraft first lands after
the event in question. Generally, the criminal is there apprehended,
the tangible evidence is there available, and the witnesses are present. A simplified procedure, if agreed upon in international conventions or bi-partite treaties, could facilitate judicial action in
the presence of the witnesses and before a jury or, where possible,
release witnesses upon proper affidavits. If damage had been
committed to persons or property in one state but the aircraft
lands in another state, rules could provide for extradition and
transfer of evidence. In some cases jurisdiction has been given to
a state where a criminal has been found or apprehended, instead
of to the state where the crime involved was committed.
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Many angles of this jurisdictional problem can be thought of
which cannot be followed through in this article, but it is believed
that even complex details could be satisfactorily disposed of at an
international round table of experts on air law, when once the
bothersome principle of nationality of aircraft is discarded. Where
the high seas enter the picture and a tort or crime has been committed in an aircraft thereupon or thereover, jurisdiction could
be permitted to the state bordering the high seas and flown over
or landed upon at the point where voyage over the high seas terminated.. If an- aircraft is abandoned at sea, the state where the
survivors first arrive would take jurisdiction. In matters of contract, and possibly also in torts and crimes, a choice might be
given between the terminating point and the starting point of the
voyage. In contracts, the state where performance is to take place
might also be considered for jurisdictional purposes. The principle of permitting allegations as to the place of the happening
of events in unknown locations, is one which has been used in
connection with railroad trains in transit and might well be considered for international air traffic. The liberty might even be allowed to make allegations as to the happening of the event in
any one of the subjacent states passed during the flight.
Arrangements for such legal procedure as above suggested
presuppose full cooperation on the part of governments and individuals concerned, and implies that the law of averages would
give states their fair proportion of cases in return for action by
their courts with justice and dispatch.
The procedure might, in many instances, be in the nature of an
arbitral settlement.11'
Annoyance and delays often caused by
technical obstructions ir court procedure have encouraged the
spirit of arbitration in civil disputes between individuals or groups;
this spirit may well be fostered and carried into the complexity
of international relations between individuals and groups, even to
the extent of permitting more direct presentation of cases than is
today possible. International claims, as now classified, are those
in which governments concerned sponsor and present the claims
on behalf of their nationals. Proposals have been made for international courts where individuals may have their cases trledwithout the services of a department of state or foreign office. 22 0 The
219. For brief discussion of questions pertaining to adjective law and
procedural rules in international claims, see Nielson, Fred Kenelm, "International Law Applied to Reclamations," (Washington: J. Byrne & Co., 1933),
pp. 65-74.
220. Borchard, E. M., "Responsibility of States for Damage," etc., Editorial Comment re Report of Subcommittee of Committee of Experts of the
League of Nations, 20 A. J. I. L. 740, 741. "The report makes a considerable
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demands of aviation may bring about something on this order,
especially if the local citizenship status of individuals receives
liberal world recognition and if universal courts could be made to
take original jurisdiction in aviation cases where certain facts
could be alleged, such as (1) diversity of citizenship; (2) place
of the event in question, either doubtful or upon or over the high
seas; (3) additional grounds. Appellate jurisdiction could also be
considered for such courts in cases originally brought before local
or state courts. Functioning of the Federal Courts of the United
States could be studied in connection with the above points, also
problems as to terms and locations of sessions of such courts,
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction with local or state courts, and
similar questions which occur because of the relation between the
Federal government and States of the United States.
As to what law shall govern-the civil law, common law or
admiralty, statutory or international law-the laws of the state taking jurisdiction would control. But it might be possible for an
international round table to dispose of the rather bothersome problems in this connection by recommending the incorporation in international agreements of clearly defined classifications as to the
types of cases arising from the legal nature of aircraft. Some law,
domestic or international, must govern the subject matter in litigation. If gaps in law occur, "equity" and "justice" are applied
until such time as domestic legislation and international law shall
close the gaps. The three legal relations of man to the state, i. e.,
as to his person, his property and his acts, which first manifested
themselves within the territorial limits of the state, according to
Zeballos cease to be local or territorial when they are carried into
an adjoining state.2 2 1 Such a transfer of legal relations characterpoint of the issue whether individuals are the subjects of international law
or are bound by it. The report concludes that they cannot be. But when one
examines the law of contraband, which places the individual under definite
duties and liabilities, when one notices the convention establishing the Central
American Court of Justice and the proposed prize court giving Individuals the
privilege of suing in the international forum, the answer given by the report,
even If it be deemed Important, Is qpen to grave doubt. International law
and treaties accord rights for the benefit of individuals and impose duties
.. As to the point that foreigners might rerestraining Individuals .......
ceive more favorable treatment than is accorded to nationals under certain cir..
cumstances, Borchard says, 'This has its element of injustice, perhaps .
It has, however, compensatory value in exerting an Important influence in
raising to the international standard the level of administration for everybody."
221. Zeballos, E. S., La Nationalitd au Point de Vue de la Legislation
Librairie de la Socete du
Humain (Paris:
Comparse et du. Droit Prv
Recuell Sirey. 1914), Tome Premier, pp. 1, .8, 8, et seq. Zeballos recognizes
that difficulty arises In determining what legislative authority would decide
the legal principles and cases of conflict among sovereign states as to provisions of the universal law. He observes that among nations the conscience
of civilization controls, and that supernational law is in fact derived from the
law of sovereign states. Private universal law consequently would vary more
or less as the criterion of civilization in the states is more or less liberal or
restrictive. Zeballos continues to say that the Republic of Argentine is the
first state to have codified supernational law by imposing silence as to Its
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izes the extraterritoriality of the law, and they become not only
international and intercontinental, in his opinion, lut the law previously founded on sovereignty becomes transfused into droit
humain (human law), because it applies its rules on the basis of
humanity, whatever may be the source and the nature of the legal
relation.
Instead of "private international law," Zeballos proposes to
substitute the expression "private human law" (droit privi
humain). This he claims would, in place of regulating conflicts
in the law of nations, control the conflicts in private law, and,
therefore, such a proposed law belonging to humanity would be
placed above national legislation. He also uses the term "supernational," because as soon as such law is declared, the voice of
the local or national law ceases to be heard. It is not opposed
to the principle of sovereignty, Zeballos believes, because sovereign
states, interested in avoiding interference with their reciprocal and
unified development, would agree to create and to recognize such
law tacitly or expressly. It is consequently, in his opinion, the
outgrowth of local sovereignties producing, as it were, a fusion of
their laws in order to codify all rights for all men, out of which
fusion develops a positive universal law.
Discrimination between the :fundamental principles or the
enduring ethical bases for law, and the temporary or administrative necessities in human relationships is important. Present and
future problems of international aviation cannot be solved by
tinkering with administrative details or by making rules for the
exceptional cases. They need a bold facing of facts with farreaching vision to evaluate the essential elements of aviation in
relation to human progress and universal purpose.
own laws whenever a foreign law is reasonably applicable. He cites as one
example among many that the civil capacity of a person twenty-one years
of age is recognized in the Republic of Argentine because of the law of that
person's domicile abroad, although the national law of Argentine requires a
person domiciled in Argentine to be twenty-two years of age in order to
exercise the same legal rights. Zeballos also cites, as examples of the application of supernational law, the United States of America and the British Commonwealth as being composed of co-existing sovereign or national units each
having laws, but whose unity is maintained because courts apply "supernational" law in the spirit of equity. supernattonal law thus having the double
mission of a regulator for humanity when the application of state or local
laws permits, and of territorial organization when domestic conflicts have
been settled and the action of all component parts is carried abroad.

